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QUESTION PRESENTED
Section 230(c)(2)(B) of the Communications Decency Act provides immunity from most civil liability to
computer-service providers for “any action taken to
enable or make available to * * * others the technical
means to restrict access to material” that “the provider or user considers to be * * * objectionable.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). The court below agreed that none
of the narrow, express exceptions to that immunity
in Section 230(e) apply here. The question presented
is:
Whether federal courts can derive an implied exception to Section 230(c)(2)(B) immunity for blocking
or filtering decisions when they are alleged to be
“driven by anticompetitive animus.”

(i)

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Malwarebytes, Inc., petitioner on review, was the
defendant-appellee below.
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, respondent on
review, was the plaintiff-appellant below.

iii
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Malwarebytes, Inc. has no parent corporation, and
no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its
stock.

iv
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., No. 17-17351 (9th Cir. Dec. 31,
2019) (reported at 946 F.3d 1040)
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., No. 17-17351 (9th Cir. Sep. 12,
2019) (reported at 938 F.3d 1026) (opinion
withdrawn and superseded on denial of rehearing)
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California:
Enigma Software Group USA LLC v. Malwarebytes Inc., No. 5:17-cv-02915-EJD (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 7, 2017) (unreported)
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
_________
No. 19_________
MALWAREBYTES, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
ENIGMA SOFTWARE GROUP USA, LLC,
Respondent.
_________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
_________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_________
Malwarebytes, Inc., respectfully petitions for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Ninth Circuit’s amended opinion, issued on
denial of rehearing, is reported at 946 F.3d 1040.
Pet. App. 1a-29a. Its original, superseded opinion is
reported at 938 F.3d 1026. Pet. App. 30a-56a. The
district court’s order granting Malwarebytes’s motion
to dismiss is unreported. Id. at 57a-65a.
JURISDICTION
The Ninth Circuit entered judgment on September
12, 2019. Pet. App. 1a, 30a. Malwarebytes timely
(1)

2
petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en
banc, which were denied on December 31, 2019. Id.
at 1a, 4a-5a. Justice Kagan extended the time to file
a petition for certiorari to May 11, 2020. This
Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), provides that:
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith
to restrict access to or availability of material
that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others
the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).
The entirety of Section 230 is reproduced in the
appendix to this petition, Pet. App. 66a-71a, as is the
text of Section 230 as it appeared before its 2018
amendments, id. at 72a-76a.
INTRODUCTION
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) is foundational to the Internet as we know it. Faced with a
revolutionary new technology, Congress chose a
system of self-regulation—one that would leave
users, rather than governments or courts, in control
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of their own experience. The cornerstone of that
system is the immunity from civil liability provided
in Section 230(c). Through that provision, Congress
ensured that Internet providers and users would be
free from the constant threat of litigation for moderating threatening or objectionable content.
Of
course, that would be impossible without adequate
tools for screening and filtering content. Thus, in
Section 230(c)(2)(B), Congress extended that immunity—without qualification—to providers for “any
action taken to enable or make available” the “technical means to restrict access to” content the provider
“considers to be” objectionable. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
Petitioner Malwarebytes, Inc., is a leading software
security firm that provides filtering tools to consumers. Its software flags security threats and other
unwanted programs, and asks users whether they
wish to retain those programs. After an update to
Malwarebytes’s software began flagging Respondent’s products as potentially unwanted programs and
providing its users the choice to use or to quarantine
the products, Respondent sued Malwarebytes. The
plain text of the Act forbids exactly this kind of
retaliatory suit.
In the decision below, however, a divided panel of
the Ninth Circuit read the Act to contain an implied
exception for actions allegedly motivated by “anticompetitive animus.” To its credit, the court did not
even try to justify that reading based on the text of
the statute. Instead, the court relied exclusively on
its own mistaken understanding of the policy interests at stake.
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This Court’s precedents flatly forbid that approach.
In recent decades, this Court has instructed lower
courts that statutory interpretation must be guided,
first and foremost, by the text, and that even compelling policy considerations cannot justify an interpretation that runs counter to the text. The decision
below defies that cardinal rule. It is therefore no
surprise that—in both its reasoning and holding—
the decision breaks from decisions of numerous other
courts. And the conflict has only gotten worse in the
short time since the court issued its decision, as a
California state court has already issued a decision
expressly disagreeing with it—opening a rift between
state and federal fora in the technology center of the
Nation.
It is critically important for the Court to correct the
Ninth Circuit’s erroneous interpretation now. By
exposing developers of filtering tools to a flood of
retaliatory litigation, the decision will have the
opposite effect from Congress’s goal of promoting
development of such tools. Making matters worse,
because the Ninth Circuit relied solely on policy
considerations that apply to all of Section 230, its
decision threatens all of Section 230(c)’s immunities.
It is an open invitation for lower courts to allow a
lawsuit anytime judges have their own policy concerns about a particular filtering decision or tool.
The decision below thus risks exposing cybersecurity
firms, as well as the most popular Internet services,
to a raft of burdensome litigation for providing the
filtering tools and exercising the content-moderation
and editorial discretion that Congress sought to
encourage. The result will be an Internet with less
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consumer choice and less protection for users from
offensive and objectionable content.
The decision below is a throwback to “a bygone era
of statutory construction,” when judges looked primarily to ill-defined indicia of congressional intent
rather than statutory text. Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus
Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court should grant
certiorari to correct the Ninth Circuit’s “casual
disregard of the rules of statutory interpretation”
and bring it back in line with the prevailing interpretations of Section 230. Id.
The petition should be granted.
STATEMENT
A. Statutory Background
The CDA emerged in 1996 as a response to the
proliferation of offensive content on the nascent
Internet. Congress sought an innovative approach
for this new technology, one that would let “Government * * * get out of the way and let parents and
individuals” “tailor what [they] see to [their] own
tastes.” 141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of
Rep. Cox). The resulting Act therefore aimed “to
encourage the development of technologies which
maximize user control over what information is
received by individuals, families, and schools who
use the Internet” and “to remove disincentives for
the development and utilization of blocking and
filtering technologies.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3), (4).
Congress identified the threat of litigation as a
particular obstacle to the development of “blocking
and filtering technologies.” See Pet. App. 8a-10a.
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Early state-court decisions had made it challenging
for Internet-based firms to take action against offensive or dangerous content by exposing those who did
to liability. See id. (discussing Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)).
The operative text of the CDA took a three-pronged
approach to eliminating the threat of such litigation.
First, in subsection (c)(1), Congress addressed immunity for hosting third-party content. It ensured
that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information
content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). That provision bars suits seeking to hold providers liable for
exercising “a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.” Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
Second, in subsection (c)(2)(A), Congress provided
immunity for those who block or filter content.
Specifically, it barred civil liability against “provider[s]” and “user[s] of an interactive computer service”
who take action “to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2)(A). That immunity is available for “any
action,” so long as it is “voluntarily taken in good
faith.” Id.
Third—and most relevant here—in subsection
(c)(2)(B), Congress extended immunity to entities
that develop and provide the technology necessary
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for filtering and blocking content. That immunity
covers “any action taken to enable or make available * * * the technical means to restrict access to” the
material described in subsection (c)(2)(A), 1 id.
§ 230(c)(2)(B)—that is, “material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,” id. § 230(c)(2)(A). Unlike the immunity for
those who themselves “restrict access to or availability of” such material, the immunity for developers of
filtering technology is not conditioned on “good
faith.” Compare id. (emphasis added), with id.
§ 230(c)(2)(B).
Congress also provided a handful of exceptions to
the CDA’s immunity, including with respect to
intellectual property laws and communications
privacy laws. See, e.g., id. § 230(e)(2), (4). None of
those exceptions refers to antitrust law or “anticompetitive” behavior. See id. § 230(e).
B. Procedural Background
1. Malwarebytes is an Internet security firm with
an international customer base. Pet. App. 12a.
Users download its software to protect themselves
from a wide array of threats on the Internet. These
include “malware,” which can damage operating
systems or steal user information, and “Potentially
Unwanted Programs” (or “PUPs”) that falsely de1

As enacted, the text cross-references subsection (c)(1), see 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B), but that is uniformly regarded as a
scrivener’s error, see Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568
F.3d 1169, 1173 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009).
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ceive users into thinking something is wrong with
their computer so that they will download paid
products to combat the supposed threats. See id.
When Malwarebytes’s “software detects an unwanted
program, it displays a notification and asks the user
if she wants to remove the program from her computer.” Id. at 58a. In other words, users make the
final decision about what gets filtered.
In October 2016, Malwarebytes adopted new criteria for identifying a PUP. Id. at 12a-13a. Using
those criteria, Malwarebytes’s software began classifying certain products of Respondent Enigma Software Group as a PUP. Id. As with any PUP, Malwarebytes’ software gave users the option to retain,
quarantine, or remove Enigma’s products. Id. at
12a-13a, 58a.
2. Enigma sued Malwarebytes, alleging state-law
business torts and unfair advertising in violation of
the Lanham Act. Id. at 58a-59a. Malwarebytes
moved to dismiss, invoking Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s
immunity for providers of filtering software. Id. at
14a. Enigma opposed the motion, claiming “that
Malwarebytes blocked Enigma’s programs for anticompetitive reasons” and that the CDA’s immunity is
unavailable under such circumstances. Id. at 19a.
The District Court granted Malwarebytes’s motion.
Id. at 65a. It held that “the plain language of the
statute” requires only that “the provider or user
consider[ ]” the filtered material “objectionable.” Id.
at 62a (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)). Thus, it was
irrelevant why Malwarebytes considered Enigma’s
products “objectionable.” See id. The court noted
that the neighboring provision addressing immunity
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for those who actually “restrict access” to content
“include[s] a good-faith requirement.” See id. at 63a
(discussing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)). Because Congress “chose not to” “include[ ] a similar reference” to
good faith in subsection (c)(2)(B), the court declined
to find a similar exception implied there. Id.
3. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.
Id. at 27a. Looking to the “history and purpose” of
the CDA, id. at 19a, the majority held that Section
230(c)(2)’s immunity provisions contain an unstated
exception for “decisions that are driven by anticompetitive animus,” id. at 11a. Although the court
acknowledged that its reading was in tension with
“the unwillingness of Congress to spell out the meaning of ‘otherwise objectionable,’ ” it felt obliged to
update the statute for “today” by reading it not “to
give providers unbridled discretion to block online
content.” Id. at 20a. Although the court did not
explain how its reading was compatible with the
operative text of the statute or the ordinary meaning
of the word “objectionable,” it found support for its
reading in “the statute’s express policies.” Id. at 20a21a.2
Judge Rawlinson dissented. The majority’s reading, she explained, “cannot be squared with the
broad language of the Act.” Id. at 29a. “Under the
language of the statute, if the blocked content is
2

Separately, the court rejected Enigma’s argument that its
Lanham Act false-advertising claim falls within the CDA’s
exception for “intellectual property” law. Pet. App. 23a-27a.
Malwarebytes does not seek review of this issue.
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‘otherwise objectionable’ to the provider, the Act
bestows immunity.” Id. (quoting Zango, 568 F.3d at
1173). “The majority’s real complaint,” the dissent
pointed out, “is not that the district court construed
the statute too broadly, but that the statute is written too broadly.” Id. at 28a. Such an issue “is one
beyond [judicial] authority to correct.” Id.
Over Judge Rawlinson’s dissent, the Ninth Circuit
denied Malwarebytes’s petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc. Id. at 4a-5a.3 This timely petition followed.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. THE DECISION BELOW DEFIES THIS
COURT’S BASIC RULES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND DEVIATES FROM
COURTS’ SETTLED UNDERSTANDINGS OF
SECTION 230.
One of this Court’s most fundamental precepts is
that statutory interpretation must begin with the
text—and end there when the text is clear. This
Court has repeatedly granted certiorari to clarify
that principle. See, e.g., Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. Ct.
at 2364 (“We cannot approve such a casual disregard
of the rules of statutory interpretation.”).

3

The panel issued an amended opinion that modified a sentence suggesting that immunity would be unavailable anytime a
decision was motivated by “the identity of the entity that
produced” the filtered content. Compare Pet. App. 39a, with id.
at 11a-12a. It made no other changes.
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The Ninth Circuit flouted that rule in this case.
The court never explained how its reading bears any
relationship to the operative text of the statute.
Instead, it relied exclusively on its own policy concerns (which were themselves questionable). Unsurprisingly, that fundamentally flawed approach led
the court to the wrong outcome in this case.
Not only did the Ninth Circuit’s approach defy this
Court’s precedent, it upended the widely-shared
consensus among lower courts that Section 230’s
immunity provisions should be read broadly. The
court also broke from the D.C. Circuit by using the
CDA’s prefatory statutory goals to override its operative text, and the resulting interpretation of subsection (c)(2)(B) has been flatly rejected by state courts
in the very same State where this litigation arose,
California. These conflicts on an issue of critical
importance further counsel this Court’s intervention.
A. The Decision Below Erroneously Relied On
Policy Rather Than Text To Interpret Section 230.
1. “[I]n any statutory construction case,” a court
must “start, of course, with the statutory text.”
Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (quoting
BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)).
This Court’s cases insisting on that approach are
legion. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534
U.S. 438, 461-462 (2002) (“We have stated time and
again that courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says there.”).
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“When the words of a statute are unambiguous,
then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry
is complete.” Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks
omitted). A statute’s text is not “ambiguous” merely
because it uses “[b]road general language.” Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980). Only after
examining “the text of the provision in question” and
discerning a genuine ambiguity may a court “move
on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the
Act in which it occurs.” N.Y. State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 655 (1995); accord Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S.
Ct. at 2364 (finding it “inappropriate[ ]” to “resort to
legislative history before consulting [a] statute’s text
and structure”). Courts “[l]ack[ ] the expertise or
authority to assess the[ ] important competing
claims” involved in policy disputes, which are “best
addressed to the Congress.” Dunn v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 480 (1997).
And, critically, “[p]olicy considerations cannot override [an] interpretation of the text and structure of
[an] Act.” Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994).
2. The Ninth Circuit broke sharply from this method of statutory interpretation. It started with its
view of the statute’s “history and purpose,” not text.
Pet. App. 19a. Indeed, the court apparently recognized that its approach was incompatible with Section 230’s text: It took note of Congress’s “unwillingness * * * to spell out the meaning of ‘otherwise
objectionable,’ ” and acknowledged that the text
confers a “broad grant of protective control” to Internet providers. Id. at 20a.
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Although the court linked its reading of the statute
to the word “objectionable,” id. at 23a, that relationship was not based on the “ordinary * * * meaning” of
the term, as this Court’s cases require, Wisconsin
Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074
(2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Ninth Circuit did not, for example, consider a definition of the term, or examine its meaning in other
contexts. Instead, the court relied exclusively on two
judges’ perspective of the underlying policy interests.
Pet. App. 20a (expressing concern that “[u]sers would
not reasonably anticipate providers blocking valuable online content”). In fact, the court properly
rejected Enigma’s only argument based on the meaning of the word “objectionable.” See id. at 21a (refusing to apply ejusdem generis to narrow the meaning
of “objectionable” given the “breadth of the term” and
the lack of similarity among subsection (c)(2)’s “enumerated categories”).
By reading an unstated exception into the Act, the
Ninth Circuit ignored a tried-and-true canon of
textual analysis. “Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Here, Congress included a “good faith” requirement
to claim immunity under subsection (c)(2)(A). The
absence of any similar language indicates the “intentional[ ] * * * exclusion” of any similar motive-based
requirement for subsection (c)(2)(B)’s immunity.
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Malwarebytes made this point in its appellate brief,
Malwarebytes C.A. Answering Br. 29-30, and rehearing petition, C.A. Reh’g Pet. 11-12. Yet the panel
majority failed to even acknowledge it.
The court’s sole justification for bypassing all of
these bedrock rules of construction was policy. Pet.
App. 19a-21a. Under this Court’s precedent, that is
no justification at all. Courts have “no roving license, in even ordinary cases of statutory interpretation, to disregard clear language simply on the view
that * * * Congress ‘must have intended’ something”
else. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S.
782, 794 (2014); see also Romag Fasteners, Inc. v.
Fossil Grp., Inc., __ S. Ct. __, slip op. at 7 (2020)
(“[T]he place for reconciling competing and incommensurable policy goals * * * is before policymakers.”). The Ninth Circuit suggested that its emphasis on policy might be justified by Congress’s inclusion of policy statements in the CDA. See Pet. App.
11a, 20a-21a. Wrong again. Congressional findings
are too “thin” a “reed upon which to base” an exception for “motive” that is “neither expressed nor * * *
fairly implied in the operative sections of the Act.”
Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249,
260 (1994).
Making matters worse, the policy concern animating the majority was wholly unfounded. The panel
feared that users would lose access to “valuable
online content” because providers might “act for their
own, and not the public, benefit.” Pet. App. 20a. But
Congress anticipated this very issue. This case
concerns immunity under subsection (c)(2)(B), which
applies only to entities that empower others to filter
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content by supplying the “technical means” to do so.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B). The majority’s concern is
directed to those who “restrict access to or availability of material” under subsection (c)(2)(A), and that
immunity is available only to those who act “in good
faith.” Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).4 The majority’s apparent
confusion about this elementary issue only reinforces
this Court’s longstanding position that courts are “ill
suited” “to make * * * policy judgments.” Perry v.
Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 393 (2012) (per curiam); see also
infra pp. 21-29 (explaining why Malwarebytes’s
position better comports with Congress’s stated
policies to promote competition and user choice).
3. The Ninth Circuit’s deeply flawed approach to
statutory construction led it to an erroneous result.
Under a plain-meaning analysis of Section 230’s
“broad language,” Pet. App. 29a (Rawlinson, J.,
dissenting), Malwarebytes is entitled to immunity
under subsection (c)(2)(B).
That provision immunizes (1) a “provider or user of
an interactive computer service” that (2) offers to
“others the technical means to restrict access to
material” that (3) “the provider or user considers * * * harassing[ ] or otherwise objectionable.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
Only the third element was
contested here, which makes sense: Malwarebytes’s
software is plainly an interactive computer service,
4

Because Malwarebytes only claims immunity under subsection (c)(2)(B), Malwarebytes takes no position on whether the
conduct alleged by Enigma in this case would fall short of the
“good faith” required by subsection (c)(2)(A).
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and it operates by giving users the “technical
means,” id. § 230(c)(2)(B), “to remove [a flagged]
program from her computer,” Pet. App. 58a.
That leaves only whether Enigma’s products are
“material that the provider” (here, Malwarebytes)
“considers to be * * * objectionable.”
47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2)(A). Enigma’s complaint answers that
question in the affirmative by conceding that Malwarebytes considers Enigma’s products “PUPs and
‘threats.’ ” C.A. E.R. 24. Because the Act requires
only that Malwarebytes “considers” the content to be
“objectionable,” that determination is sufficient for
immunity to apply. The “ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning,” Wisconsin Cent., 138 S. Ct. at
2074 (internal quotation marks omitted), of “objectionable” is easily capacious enough to encompass
programs that Malwarebytes has deemed a “threat”
or a “potentially unwanted program.” See, e.g.,
Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1995 ed.)
(defining “objectionable” as “[p]rovoking disapproval
or opposition: offensive”); The American Heritage
College Dictionary (3d ed. 1993) (similar definition).
Section 230(c)’s caption reinforces that reading. See
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 539-540 (2015)
(plurality op.). It clarifies the provision is meant to
protect “blocking and screening of offensive material,” even though the word “offensive” is not one of the
enumerated categories in § 230(c)(2)’s list. 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c) (emphasis added).
Because the Ninth Circuit only reached a contrary
decision by disregarding this Court’s rules for statutory interpretation, this Court’s review is warranted.
See Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). Allowing the decision below to
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stand will embolden lower courts to carve out additional policy-driven exceptions to Congress’s dulyenacted legislation. See infra pp. 31-35.
B. The Decision Below Splits From The Approach Of Numerous Other Courts.
Given how starkly the decision below deviates from
this Court’s precedents, it is no surprise that it
renders the Ninth Circuit an outlier on Section 230
immunity.
1. Outside of the Ninth Circuit, courts are in
agreement that Section 230’s immunity provisions
must be read expansively. As the Seventh Circuit
has explained, that conclusion flows from Congress’s
choice to use broad language: “[T]he reason a legislature writes a general statute is to avoid any need
to traipse through the United States Code” and state
lawbooks to “consider all potential sources of liability, one at a time.” Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for
Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008). Courts have widely
honored that choice in the context of Section 230.
Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12,
18 (1st Cir. 2016) (“There has been near-universal
agreement that section 230 should not be construed
grudgingly.”); Force v. Facebook, 934 F.3d 53, 64 (2d
Cir. 2019) (noting “general agreement” that the CDA
“should be construed broadly in favor of immunity”),
petition for cert. filed, No. 19-859 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2020);
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (referring to “§ 230’s broad
immunity”); Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776, 788 (Cal.
2018) (plurality op.) (“the tools of statutory interpretation compel[ ] a broad construction of section 230”);
Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d
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1011, 1016 (N.Y. 2011) (“Both state and federal
courts around the country have generally interpreted
Section 230 immunity broadly * * * .” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); accord Doe v. MySpace,
Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Johnson v.
Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010); Almeida v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir.
2006); Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google,
LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2019).5
The decision below, however, takes the opposite
approach. Motivated by policy concerns, it discerned
“limitations in the scope of immunity” found nowhere
in the Act’s text. Pet. App. 18a. The Ninth Circuit
therefore eschewed the broad reading of Section 230
adopted by other courts. And this is not the first
time that the Ninth Circuit has resorted to policy
arguments to give the CDA a narrow construction.
See Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851853 (9th Cir. 2016) (reading the Act to have a “narrow language and * * * purpose”).
This decision
cements the court’s outlier status.
2. The decision below also places the Ninth Circuit
in square conflict with the D.C. Circuit regarding the
proper relationship of Section 230’s express policy
goals, see 47 U.S.C. § 230(b), with its operative text,
see id. § 230(c)-(e).
The panel repeatedly—and
selectively—resorted to subsection (b)’s policy goals
5

Although some of these decisions speak specifically in terms of
subsection (c)(1), that merely reflects the facts of those cases.
Nothing in the opinions’ reasoning suggests the broad reading
is limited to that subsection.
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to justify its atextual approach to statutory construction.
See Pet. App. 20a-21a (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b)(3), (4)).
The D.C. Circuit has rejected that analytical approach. In Comcast Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the
FCC argued that it possessed regulatory power over
“an Internet service provider’s network management
practices.” Id. at 644. Lacking any “express statutory authority over such practices,” id., the Commission turned to the policy goals enacted in subsection
(b) of the CDA, claiming those goals could “anchor
the exercise of [regulatory] authority” even without
an express grant of power. Id. at 652. The D.C.
Circuit rejected that argument, holding that “statements of policy, by themselves, do not create ‘statutorily mandated responsibilities.’ ” Id. at 644. The
alternative approach, the court explained, would
“virtually free the Commission from its congressional
tether.” Id. at 655. The D.C. Circuit’s approach is
flatly at odds with Enigma’s efforts to carve out an
exception to the “statutorily mandated” immunity by
relying on the CDA’s “policy statements alone.” Id.
at 644, 654 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. In near-record time, the Ninth Circuit’s holding
has provoked disagreement with a California state
court. Just a few weeks after the panel issued its
original decision, the California Superior Court
issued an opinion “disagree[ing]” with the panel’s
approach, finding that it “ignore[d] the plain language of the statute by reading a good faith limitation into section 230(c)(2)(B).” Prager Univ. v. Google
LLC, No. 19CV340667, 2019 WL 8640569, at *10
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(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2019), appeal docketed, No.
H047714 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2019). That holding
led the court to reject a video-maker’s claim that
YouTube acted in bad faith by allowing users—such
as parents, school administrators, or libraries—to
enable a “Restricted Mode” that filters certain sensitive content, such as graphic violence and sexual
material. Id. at *2, *4, *9-10.
Existing California precedent concerning Section
230 assures that decision will be affirmed. The
California Court of Appeal has already held, in a
different case, that “Section 230 imposes a subjective
element into the [immunity] determination” by
conferring immunity “so long as [the developer of the
filter] deemed the material to be * * * objectionable.”
Pallorium, Inc. v. Jared, No. G036124, 2007 WL
80955, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2007) (emphasis
added and internal quotation marks omtited). And
that reading comports with the California Supreme
Court’s instruction to interpret Section 230 “literally”
according to its text. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d
510, 529 (Cal. 2006). Thus, there is nothing to be
gained by postponing consideration of the question
presented. Delay would also be harmful given the
high risk of forum shopping: Because California is
located within the Ninth Circuit—and home to the
Nation’s hub of technological development—plaintiffs
now have every incentive to bring suit in federal
courts. Certiorari is necessary to eliminate that risk.
II. THE QUESTION PRESENTED
SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE.

IS

OF

Even if the CDA’s text left any ambiguity to be
resolved by reference to policy, the Ninth Circuit
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profoundly misunderstood how those considerations
apply to this case. In fact, the decision below undermines Congress’s stated goals in enacting the
CDA. It is therefore vital for the Court to address
the question presented now. Otherwise, this interpretation will fester—and in the circuit where Section 230 matters the most.
Congress’s central goal in enacting Section 230 was
to promote a vibrant marketplace to give users tools
to provide a safe Internet experience for themselves
and their families, without interference by state and
federal regulation. By allowing plaintiffs to undermine the immunity granted by Section 230(c)(2)(B)
and subjecting filtering-tool providers to prolonged
and costly litigation, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
accomplishes the opposite by interposing courts as
regulators between Internet users and their choice of
filtering tools.
Worse still, there is no logical limit to the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning. Its ruling invites judges to chip
away at all of Section 230(c)’s immunities, including
the oft-invoked immunity of 230(c)(1) that protects
websites from liability for third-party content. And
because the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is rooted in
policy considerations unmoored from specific statutory text, it invites courts to impose additional policydriven exceptions beyond the competition context.
A. The Decision Below Threatens The User
Choice And Internet Security Goals That
Motivated Section 230(c)(2)(B).
1. Congress’s goal in enacting Section 230, and
especially 230(c)(2)(B), was to put Internet users in
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the driver’s seat of their own online experience by
allowing them to choose the filtering tools that best
fit their needs without government interference.
Congress recognized that services such as Malwarebytes’s “offer users a great degree of control over the
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops,” and that the “Internet and other
interactive computer services have flourished, to the
benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2), (4). Congress thus declared that “the policy of the United
States” is “to preserve the vibrant and competitive
free market that presently exists for the Internet * * *, unfettered by Federal or State regulation”;
“to encourage the development of technologies which
maximize user control over what information is
received”; and “to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies.” Id. § 230(b)(2)-(4). As one of the bill’s
co-sponsors, Representative Chris Cox, explained,
“every one of us will be able to tailor what we see to
our own tastes” based on Section 230’s promotion of a
vibrant free market in filtering technology. 141
Cong. Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). In
fact, Section 230 was introduced as a user-driven
alternative to a bill that sought to combat offensive
content through top-down government regulation.
See Pet. App. 9a-11a.6

6

Both provisions were enacted, but Section 230’s governmentregulation-based rival was largely invalidated by this Court for
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As Judge Wilkinson put it in the first major circuit
court decision on Section 230—since widely adopted
by other courts—Congress created a “broad immunity” “to encourage service providers to self-regulate
the dissemination of offensive material.” Zeran, 129
F.3d at 331; accord Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 29
(“Congress did not sound an uncertain trumpet when
it enacted the CDA, and it chose to grant broad
protections * * * . Showing that a website operates
through a meretricious business model is not enough
to strip away those protections.”). Part of Congress’s
motivation was to overrule a New York state court
opinion, under which “computer service providers
who regulated the dissemination of offensive material on their services risked subjecting themselves to
liability, because such regulation cast the service
provider in the role of a publisher.” Zeran, 129 F.3d
at 331 (discussing Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL
323710); see also Pet. App. 9a-10a; H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 104-458, at 194 (1996), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 208. The statutory findings, policy
statements, and legislative history thus all indicate a
desire to let the market, and not courts, decide how
content should be filtered.
But the Ninth Circuit’s decision upsets the immunity that Congress created to achieve that goal. In
place of the “broad immunity” prescribed by Congress, the Ninth Circuit has authorized courts to
abrogate immunity for filtering decisions that, in the

violating the First Amendment. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 877-879 (1997).
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court’s opinion, Congress would not have wanted to
protect. See Pet. App. 22a. Under that reasoning,
any plaintiff can potentially convince a court to craft
an exception for a particular set of facts or alleged
motivation, thereby exposing the defendant to the
whole panoply of state and federal statutory and
common law causes of action that Congress sought to
preempt. See id. at 13a-14a. So much for providers
of filtering tools being “unfettered by Federal or
State regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
2. The possibility that a defendant will ultimately
prove that it acted with motives a court would consider pure is little comfort. Congress created an
immunity from suit precisely because, as Judge
Wilkinson observed, it “recognized the threat that
tort-based lawsuits pose” and so enacted Section 230
“to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum.” Zeran, 129 F.3d
at 330. As the same court later elaborated, “immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability and it is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,
254 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). For that reason, “Section 230 immunity” should
be “accorded effect at the first logical point in the
litigation process.” Id. In other contexts, this Court
has recognized that immunities are not “merely * * *
a defense to monetary liability,” but rather “an
immunity from suit” altogether, Fed. Mar. Comm’n
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 766 (2002)
(sovereign immunity), and “an entitlement not to
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stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,”
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (qualified immunity).
If not afforded immunity from suit altogether, Internet services will “face death by ten thousand
duck-bites.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). That is why “section 230
must be interpreted to protect websites not merely
from ultimate liability, but from having to fight
costly and protracted legal battles.” Id. at 1175.
The danger of abusive litigation in this area is no
idle threat. That is because litigious malware purveyors can easily use the exception recognized by the
Ninth Circuit to plead around Section 230(c)(2)(B) at
the motion-to-dismiss stage. The decision below
exacerbates that problem by setting a low bar for
what a putative competitor must allege. See Pet.
App. 23a (accepting Enigma’s claims of “anticompetitive” behavior without enumerating specific facts).
It is not difficult for a purveyor of malware to
brand themselves as an anti-malware provider by
combining purported security features with objectionable material. For example, in an earlier Ninth
Circuit case, the plaintiff combined a supposed
“[s]pam [b]locker” with noxious adware that bombarded users with pop-up ads. Zango, 568 F.3d at
1170. After the decision below, any purveyor of
malware and adware now has a playbook to overcome Section 230(c)(2)(B) simply by adding a purported security feature to their obnoxious software.
Even if the text of Section 230(c)(2)(B) gave courts
license to second-guess the motivations for internet-
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security firms’ classification decisions, judges would
be poorly positioned to do so. There are numerous
valid reasons Internet-security firms may flag putatively competitive software as a threat. Even wellknown brands have had security vulnerabilities or
unexpectedly caused computers to slow down,7 which
could justify a potentially-unwanted-program label.
More pernicious is fake antivirus software, a common problem that has been a target of government
enforcement.
Examples include a $163 million
judgment the FTC obtained against an outfit that
sold “scareware” to “trick consumers into thinking
their computers were infected with malicious software, and then sold them software to ‘fix’ their nonexistent problem”8; as well as a $35 million settlement with the well-known retailer Office Depot for
marketing similar “scamware” that “tricked customers into buying millions of dollars’ worth of computer
repair and technical services by deceptively claiming
their software had found malware symptoms on the
customers’ computers.”9 These firms could write a
7

See, e.g., Eric Griffith, How to Rid a New PC of Crapware,
PCMag (Apr. 1, 2020), https://bit.ly/3ch9BMM (explaining that
a well-known antivirus program is “likely to slow [a user’s]
PC”).
8

Press Release, FTC, FTC Case Results in $163 Million Judgment Against “Scareware” Marketer (Oct. 2, 2012),
https://bit.ly/3bjkJIx.
9

Press Release, FTC, Office Depot and Tech Support Firm Will
Pay $35 Million to Settle FTC Allegations That They Tricked
Consumers into Buying Costly Computer Repair Services (Mar.
27, 2019), https://bit.ly/3afWpWH.
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self-serving complaint like Enigma’s to circumvent
Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity for cybersecurity
firms that seek to protect consumers from these
threats.
3. Congress instead intended consumers and their
cybersecurity providers to evaluate Internet threats
for themselves. By inviting courts to interpose
themselves between consumers and cybersecurity
services, the Ninth Circuit’s decision threatens
consumer choice and Internet security.
Purported “competitors” may in fact be legitimate
threats to Internet users. See supra p. 26 & n.8.
Moreover, with millions of potential threats on the
Internet, it is impossible for filtering-software companies to individually analyze every potential danger
to users. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) and CAUCE North America, Inc. explained
below, filtering software requires the use of automated algorithms to predict threats, which may
sometimes flag potentially competitive software.
EFF et al. C.A. Amicus Br. 9-10; see also ESET, LLC
C.A. Amicus Br. 7-8 (explaining that Malwarebytes’s
competitor ESET “encounter[s] more than 300,000
new unique and suspicious objects every day” and
that “it is not possible to sort through threats and
other objectionable programs one by one and give
deference to those that might plausibly claim to be
competitors”).
The Ninth Circuit’s decision puts cybersecurity
firms in a predicament. They can try their best to
protect consumers against all threats, knowing that
they will subject themselves to expensive lawsuits
when they designate an alleged competitor as a
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threat—either forcing them out of business or raising
prices for consumers. Or they can avoid liability by
taking a more permissive stance, exposing customers
to threats. In either case, consumers end up with an
inferior Internet experience. And facing such a
choice, new firms may be dissuaded from entering
the cybersecurity market altogether—exactly the
opposite of what Congress wanted.
There is no need for those dire results. Section 230
has worked just as Congress intended to promote
competition in filtering technology. Enigma’s own
complaint identified over 40 competing cybersecurity
companies. C.A. E.R. 39. 10 The Ninth Circuit’s
justification for its policy-driven exception to Section
230(c)(2)(B) was a fear that such firms would “act for
their own, and not the public, benefit” by adopting
“filtering practices aimed at suppressing competition,
rather than protecting internet users.” Pet. App.
20a. In the “vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists * * * unfettered by Federal or
State regulation,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2), however,
such a strategy would surely backfire. The reputational damage from self-serving filtering decisions
would outweigh the benefits of dissuading a few
10

This shows how unfounded the Ninth Circuit’s competition
concerns are in this market. In the antitrust context, such a
competitive market would lead to prompt dismissal of any claim
that a company had monopoly power. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (giving
examples of “nearly 100%,” “80% to 95%,” “87%,” and “over twothirds” as examples of market shares that could support a
monopolization claim).
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customers from trying a competitor’s product. And if
a customer does find that her cybersecurity provider
is not acting in her interest, she has dozens of alternatives to choose from.
B. The Decision Below Will Undermine Other
Tools That Help Internet Users Curate
Their Own Online Experience.
The fallout of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling will not be
limited to cybersecurity software. Numerous online
services—including tools offered by many of the most
commonly used Internet products—are protected by
Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity. The Ninth Circuit’s
decision, if allowed to stand, will invite lawsuits
against these companies’ filtering decisions with
ginned-up allegations of anticompetitive motives.
For example, Facebook gives users tools to hide or
block content posted by others on their personal
Facebook page and has successfully invoked Section
230(c)(2)(B) to defend those tools.11 YouTube offers
users “Restricted Mode”: “an optional setting that
you can use on YouTube to help screen out potentially mature content that you may prefer not to see or
don’t want others using your device to see.”12 Likewise, Twitter offers users a “quality filter” that
allows them to “filter[ ] lower-quality content from
[their] notifications,” and it gives users tools to limit
11

Fehrenbach v. Zeldin, No. 17-CV-5282 (JFB) (ARL), 2018 WL
4242452, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4242453 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2018).
12

YouTube Help, Disable or enable Restricted Mode, Google,
https://bit.ly/2KftqaQ (last visited May 11, 2020).
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who can send them direct messages and to screen
messages with “potentially sensitive” content. 13
Popular message-board website Reddit’s entire
content-moderation program relies on “[v]olunteer
community moderators” who use Reddit-provided
tools “to remove any post that does not follow their
community’s rules, without any involvement or
direction from Reddit, Inc.” 14
These are all examples of tools that make the Internet a safer and more pleasant place for consumers. They are just the types of “action taken to
enable * * * the technical means to restrict access to
material” that Section 230(c)(2)(B) was meant to
immunize. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B).
Yet under the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Section
230(c)(2)(B) would no longer provide the kind of
absolute immunity Congress intended “to encourage
the development of technologies which maximize
user control.” Id. § 230(b)(3). Rather, plaintiffs
whose content is flagged by these tools may write
themselves an exception to Section 230(c)(2)(B) by
alleging that YouTube or Reddit or Twitter acted
with anticompetitive animus towards their content.
Indeed, that is exactly what the plaintiff alleged in
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About the Notifications timeline, Twitter,
https://bit.ly/3eu7VRv (last visited May 11, 2020); About Direct
Messages, Twitter, https://bit.ly/3bldCQ2 (last visited May 11,
2020).
14

Transparency Report 2019, Reddit, https://bit.ly/2ysFhj9 (last
visited May 11, 2020) (showing that most removals are by usermoderators using Reddit-provided tools).
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Prager, supra pp. 19-20, the decision that expressly
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s holding here.
C. The Decision Below Endangers All Of Section 230’s Important Immunities.
The logic of the Ninth Circuit’s decision also applies naturally to the rest of Section 230(c)’s immunities and will give courts license to imply additional
exceptions beyond one for anticompetitive animus.
The opinion’s reasoning thus invites replacing the
“broad immunity” that “Congress enacted,” Zeran,
129 F.3d at 331, with an unpredictable quasiimmunity riddled with holes derived from judicial
policy preferences.
1. Most obviously, any exception read into Section
230(c)(2)(B) would almost certainly apply to Section
230(c)(2)(A). After all, the “material” to which subsection (c)(2)(B) applies merely incorporates subsection (c)(2)(A)’s list by reference. Moreover, because
subsection (c)(2)(A) has the “good faith” condition
that (c)(2)(B) lacks, see supra pp. 14-15, any exception read into (c)(2)(B) would apply even more readily
to (c)(2)(A).
But subsection (c)(2)(A) is crucial to what Congress
intended when it enacted subsection (c) as a
“[p]rotection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and
screening of offensive material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
As Judge Easterbook has explained, Section 230(c)(2)
accomplishes that goal by working as a “safety net”;
a “web host that * * * filter[s] out offensive material
is not liable to the censored customer,” thereby
“induc[ing] web hosts * * * to take more care to
protect the privacy and sensibilities of third parties.”
Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659-660 (7th Cir.
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2003). That goal is understandable: An Internet
where services like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter
could not screen graphically violent and sexual
content for fear of facing massive litigation costs
would be a scary place.
Yet the Ninth Circuit’s insertion of atextual exceptions into Section 230(c)(2) will discourage moderation and restore the legal regime Congress intended
to overturn with Section 230, in which content moderation creates liability. See supra p. 23. “Content
moderation at scale is impossible to do well” because
of the sheer complexity: services like Facebook
receive hundreds of millions of uploads every day,
requiring imperfect mass-automated moderation
supported by thousands of human judgment calls.15
Predictably, most anyone whose content is restricted
will be upset. Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning,
so long as that person can come up with plausible
allegations that the web service restricted the content in order to favor some competing content, the
defendant will be unable to successfully invoke
Section 230(c)(2) immunity at the motion-to-dismiss
stage. Knowing that Section 230(c)(2) will offer only
modest protection against litigious content-providers,
interactive computer services will have a tremendous
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Mike Masnick, Masnick’s Impossibility Theorem: Content
Moderation At Scale Is Impossible To Do Well, TechDirt (Nov.
20, 2019), https://bit.ly/2z1XpRh; see Kate Klonick, The New
Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1635-48 (2018) (describing
Facebook’s multi-tiered, highly-complex moderation system).
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incentive to scale back content moderation—exactly
the opposite of the outcome Congress intended.
For example, Facebook’s Community Standards
include the platform’s restrictions on hate speech,
violent and graphic content, nudity and sexual
activity, and sexual solicitation—all under the heading of “Objectionable Content.”16 That is the exact
term used in Section 230(c)(2)’s catch-all provision.
If courts fashion carve-outs to Section 230(c)(2)
immunity for restricting “objectionable” content,
purveyors of the most unpleasant software and
material could fashion an exception for themselves.
2. The decision below also risks infecting the
neighboring immunity in Section 230(c)(1). Whereas
subsection (c)(2) immunizes actions to restrict or
take down content, subsection (c)(1) immunizes the
decision to leave up third-party content. Because the
Ninth Circuit’s purposive reasoning was not tethered
to any text in (c)(2) and implied an exception from
the findings and policy statements that apply to all
of Section 230, there is nothing stopping plaintiffs
from asking courts to fashion the same exception for
(c)(1).
Subsection (c)(1) has been credited by many as
having “[c]reated the Internet” as we know it today.
See, e.g., Jeff Kosseff, The Twenty-Six Words That
Created the Internet 4 (2019) (explaining that nine
of the ten most popular websites in the United States
16

Community Standards: Part III. Objectionable Content,
Facebook, https://bit.ly/2KgiUAq (last visited May 11, 2020)
(emphasis added).
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principally publish third-party content and so rely on
Section 230(c)(1)). The vibrant Internet we know
will be imperiled when plaintiffs seek to circumvent
Section 230(c)(1)’s protections using the approach
adopted by the Ninth Circuit below.
3. The fallout from the decision below is also not
limited to anticompetitive motivation. Following in
its logical footsteps, plaintiffs will ask courts to imply
other exceptions based on the broad language in the
findings and policy statements of Section 230(a) and
(b). Prominent U.S. Senators have already done so,
suggesting that subsection (a)(3)’s finding that “[t]he
Internet and other interactive computer services
offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse” should be read to imply an immunity exception if a defendant’s content moderation is not viewpoint-neutral.17
If plaintiffs can persuade judges that an Internet
service is not providing “educational and informational resources” or “unique opportunities for cultural development,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1), (3), or is not
“promot[ing] the continued development of the
Internet,” id. § 230(b)(1), will the defendant lose
Section 230 immunity? Such potentially far-reaching
17

See Press Release, Senator Ted Cruz, Sen. Cruz: The Pattern
of Political Censorship Seen Across Technology Companies is
Highly Concerning (Jan. 17, 2018), https://bit.ly/2zdfuMB (Sen.
Cruz committee-hearing comment suggesting that “if you are
not a neutral public forum,” then “the entire predicate for
liability immunity” under Section 230 is not satisfied); Senator
Josh Hawley (@HawleyMO), Twitter (Nov. 27, 2018, 1:22 PM),
https://bit.ly/2VB3CLQ (suggesting same).

35
arguments will be hard to distinguish from the Ninth
Circuit’s use of the policy statements to limit the
scope of immunity in this case.
III. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO
RESOLVE THE QUESTION PRESENTED,
AND OTHER OPPORTUNITIES MAY NOT
SOON PRESENT THEMSELVES.
1. This case presents an important and purely legal
question to the Court without any complicating
factual or procedural issues. The Ninth Circuit’s
ruling that Enigma’s complaint should survive
dismissal hinges entirely on a straightforward question of statutory interpretation about the scope of
Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity. That is an important question that is cleanly presented for this
Court to answer.
2. Moreover, this Court may not soon get a better
chance to answer the question presented. As the
framers of Section 230 recognized, the cost of litigation may itself be enough to force defendants to
settle. See supra pp. 5-6, 24-29. When facing onerous discovery and legal fees, providers like Malwarebytes may well have to capitulate to plaintiffs’ demands not to be marked as threats, making the
Internet a more dangerous place for consumers and
depriving courts of the ability to provide further
guidance on Section 230’s immunities. If the Ninth
Circuit’s atextual exceptions leak into the surrounding provisions of Section 230, see supra pp. 31-34,
Internet platforms deciding whether to filter offensive content or whether to remove third-party content challenged by a litigious plaintiff will have
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similar incentives to settle rather than bear the cost
of litigation.
Those dangers are especially heightened because of
the Ninth Circuit’s outsized role in the technology
and Internet sphere. The decision below severely
limited the main precedent that scholars have credited with dissuading suits nationwide against companies providing filtering tools.18 Because so many
technology companies are based within the Ninth
Circuit, plaintiffs will often have the ability and
incentive to bring suit in that circuit, minimizing the
chances that another court of appeals or state court
will be presented with the same question.
In short, by the time this Court is presented with
another opportunity to evaluate whether Section 230
allows judge-made, policy-based exceptions, there is
a great danger that filtering-software providers and
others who rely on Section 230 will already have
modified their business practices in response to the
decision below, making the Internet a less safe and
vibrant place for consumers.

18

See Eric Goldman, The Ten Most Important Section 230
Rulings, 20 Tulane J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1, 6-7 (2017).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
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SUMMARY**
Communications Decency Act
The panel filed (1) an order withdrawing its
opinion and replacing the opinion with an amended
opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and
denying on behalf of the court a petition for
rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion
reversing the district court’s dismissal, as barred by
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act, of claims
under New York law and the Lanham Act’s false
advertising provision.
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, and
Malwarebytes, Inc., were providers of software that
helped internet users to filter unwanted content from
their computers. Enigma alleged that Malwarebytes
configured its software to block users from accessing
Enigma’s software in order to divert Enigma’s
customers.
Section 230, the so-called “Good Samaritan”
provision of the Communications Decency Act,
immunizes software providers from liability for
actions taken to help users block certain types of
unwanted online material, including material that is
of a violent or sexual nature or is “otherwise
objectionable.” Distinguishing Zango, Inc. v.
Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009),

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the
court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of
the reader.
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the panel held that the phrase “otherwise
objectionable” does not include software that the
provider finds objectionable for anticompetitive
reasons. As to the state-law claims, the panel held
that Enigma’s allegations of anticompetitive animus
were sufficient to withstand dismissal. As to the
federal claim, the panel further held that § 230’s
exception for intellectual property claims did not
apply because this false advertising claim did not
relate to trademarks or any other type of intellectual
property. The panel remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson wrote that § 230 is
broadly worded, and Enigma did not persuasively
make a case for limitation of the statute beyond its
provisions.
COUNSEL
Terry Budd (argued), Budd Law PLLC, Wexford,
Pennsylvania; Christopher M. Verdini and Anna
Shabalov,
K&L
Gates
LLP,
Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania; Edward P. Sangster, K&L Gates LLP,
San Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Tyler G. Newby (argued), Guinevere L. Jobson, and
Sapna Mehta, Fenwick & West LLP, San Francisco,
California; Benjamin A. Field, Neal Kumar Katyal,
and Reedy Swanson, Hogan Lovells US LLP,
Washington, D.C; for Defendant-Appellee.
Sophia Cope and Aaron Mackey, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, San Francisco, California, for Amici
Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation and CAUCE
North America.
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Venkat Balasubramani, Focal PLLC, Seattle,
Washington; Eric Goldman, Professor; Jess Miers,
Law Student; Santa Clara University School of Law,
Santa Clara, California; for Amici Curiae
Cybersecurity Law Professors.
Anna-Rose Mathieson and Charles Kagay, California
Appellate Law Group LLP, San Francisco,
California, for Amicus Curiae ESET, LLC.
Brian M. Willen, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati,
New York, New York; Lauren Gallo White, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, San Francisco,
California; for Amicus Curiae Internet Association.
ORDER
The opinion filed September 12, 2019 (Docket
Entry No. 42), and appearing at 938 F.3d 1026, is
withdrawn and replaced by an amended opinion
concurrently filed with this order.
With these amendments, Judge Rawlinson voted to
grant the petition for panel rehearing. Judges
Schroeder and Lasnik voted to deny the petition for
panel rehearing. Judge Rawlinson voted to grant the
petition for rehearing en banc. Judges Schroeder and
Lasnik recommended denying the petition for
rehearing en banc.
The full court has been advised of the petition for
rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote
on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.
App. P. 35.
The petition for rehearing and petition for
rehearing en banc are DENIED. No further petitions
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for rehearing
entertained.

or

rehearing

en

banc

will

be

OPINION
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
OVERVIEW
This dispute concerns § 230, the so-called “Good
Samaritan” provision of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, enacted primarily to protect
minors from harmful online viewing. The provision
immunizes computer-software providers from
liability for actions taken to help users block certain
types of unwanted, online material. The provision
expressly describes material of a violent or sexual
nature, but also includes a catchall for material that
is “otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). We
have previously recognized that the provision
establishes a subjective standard whereby internet
users and software providers decide what online
material is objectionable. See Zango Inc. v. Kaspersky
Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009).
The parties to this dispute are both providers of
software that help internet users filter unwanted
content from their computers. Plaintiff-Appellant
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC has alleged
violations of New York state law and a violation of
the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision. Each
claim is based on the allegation that defendant,
Malwarebytes Inc., has configured its software to
block users from accessing Enigma’s software in
order to divert Enigma’s customers. The district
court, relying on Zango, dismissed the action as
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barred by § 230’s broad recognition of immunity. We
did not hold in Zango, however, that the immunity
was limitless.
This case differs from Zango in that here the
parties are competitors. In this appeal Enigma
contends that the “otherwise objectionable” catchall
is not broad enough to encompass a provider’s
objection to a rival’s software in order to suppress
competition. Enigma points to Judge Fisher’s
concurrence in Zango warning against an overly
expansive interpretation of the provision that could
lead to anticompetitive results. We heed that
warning and reverse the district court’s decision that
read Zango to require such an interpretation. We
hold that the phrase “otherwise objectionable” does
not include software that the provider finds
objectionable for anticompetitive reasons.
Malwarebytes contends that it had legitimate
reasons for finding Enigma’s software objectionable
apart from any anticompetitive effect, and that
immunity should therefore apply on Enigma’s statelaw claims, even if the district court erred in its
interpretation of Zango. We conclude, however, that
Enigma’s allegations of anticompetitive animus are
sufficient to withstand dismissal.
Enigma’s federal claim warrants an additional
analytical step. The CDA’s immunity provision
contains an exception for intellectual property
claims, stating that “[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). Enigma
has brought a false advertising claim under the
Lanham Act, a federal statute that deals with
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trademarks. Enigma contends that the false
advertising claim is one “pertaining to intellectual
property” and thus outside the scope of § 230
immunity.
Although it is true that the Lanham Act itself deals
with intellectual property, i.e. trademarks, Enigma’s
false advertising claim does not relate to trademarks
or any other type of intellectual property. The
district court therefore correctly held that the
intellectual property exception to immunity does not
apply to the false advertising claim. The district
court went on to hold that under Zango’s application
of § 230 immunity, Malwarebytes was immune from
liability for false advertising. As with Enigma’s state
law claims, we hold that the district court read
Zango too broadly in dismissing the federal claim.
We therefore reverse the judgment on this claim as
well.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
This appeal centers on the immunity provision
contained in § 230(c)(2) of the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1996). The
CDA, which was enacted as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, contains this “Good
Samaritan” provision that, in subparagraph B,
immunizes internet-service providers from liability
for giving internet users the technical means to
restrict access to the types of material described in
the subparagraph A. Id. § 230(c)(2)(B). The material,
as described in that subparagraph, is “material that
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
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lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable.” Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).1
This grant of immunity dates back to the early
days of the internet when concerns first arose about
children being able to access online pornography.
Parents could not program their computers to block
online pornography, and this was at least partially
due to a combination of trial court decisions in New
York that had deterred the creation of onlinefiltration efforts. In the first case, Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., a federal court held that passive
providers of online services and content were not
charged with knowledge of, or responsibility for, the
content on their network. See 776 F. Supp. 135, 139–
43 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Therefore, if a provider remained
passive and uninvolved in filtering third-party
material from its network, the provider could not be

1

Section 230(c) is entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’
blocking and screening of offensive material.” The relevant
subsection (2), “Civil liability,” states, in full, as follows:
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of –
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively
violent,
harassing,
or
otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph [A].”
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A), (B).
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held liable for any offensive content it carried from
third parties. See id.
The corollary of this rule, as later articulated by a
New York state trial court, was that once a service
provider undertook to filter offensive content from its
network, it assumed responsibility for any offensive
content it failed to filter, even if it lacked knowledge
of the content. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995) (“Prodigy’s conscious choice, to gain the
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a
greater liability than CompuServe and other
computer networks that make no such choice.”),
superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137, as recognized in
Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of N.Y., Inc., 952
N.E.2d 1011 (2011). Representative Chris Cox
warned during debates on proposed legislation aimed
at overruling Stratton Oakmont, that premising
liability on providers’ efforts to filter out offensive
material was deterring software companies from
providing the filtering software and tools that could
help parents block pornography and other offensive
material from their home computers. See 141 Cong.
Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
The Stratton Oakmont decision, along with the
increasing public concern about pornography on the
internet, served as catalysts for legislators to
consider greater internet regulation. Congress
considered, in early 1995, two different amendments
to the Telecommunications Act. The first, called the
Exon-Coats amendment, targeted pornography at
the source by prohibiting its dissemination. See id. at
16,068. Proponents of this bill argued that parents
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lacked the technological sophistication needed to
implement online-filtration tools and that the
government therefore needed to step in. Id. at
16,099. The second proposal, entitled the Online
Family Empowerment Act (“OFEA”), targeted
internet pornography at the receiving end by
encouraging further development of filtration tools.
Id. at 22,044. Proponents of this bill pointed out that
prohibiting pornography at the source raised
constitutional issues involving prior restraint, and
argued that parents, not government bureaucrats,
were better positioned to protect their children from
offensive online material. Id. at 16,013.
On February 1, 1996, Congress enacted both
approaches as part of the CDA. The Exon-Coats
amendment was codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223, but was
later invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
877–79 (1997). Before us is OFEA’s approach,
enacted as § 230(c)(2) of the CDA. See Pub L. No.
104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39. By immunizing
internet-service providers from liability for any
action taken to block, or help users block offensive
and objectionable online content, Congress overruled
Stratton Oakmont and thereby encouraged the
development of more sophisticated methods of online
filtration. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104879, at 194
(1996).
The history of § 230(c)(2) shows that access to
pornography was Congress’s motivating concern, but
the language used in § 230 included much more,
covering any online material considered to be
“excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)–(B).
Perhaps to guide the interpretation of this broad
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language, Congress took the rather unusual step of
setting forth policy goals in the immediately
preceding paragraph of the statute. See id. § 230(b).
Of the five goals, three are particularly relevant
here. These goals were “to encourage the
development of technologies which maximize user
control”; “to empower parents to restrict their
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate
online content”; and “to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services.”
See id. § 230(b)(2)–(4).
This court has decided one prior case where we
considered the scope of § 230, but were principally
concerned with which types of online-service
providers Congress intended to immunize. See
Zango, 568 F.3d at 1175. We acknowledged that
providers of computer security software can benefit
from § 230 immunity, and that such providers have
discretion to identify what online content is
considered “objectionable,” id., but we had no reason
to discuss the scope of that discretion. The separate
concurrence in Zango focused on the future need for
considering appropriate limitations on provider
control. See id. at 1178–80 (Fisher, J. concurring).
District courts have differed in their interpretations
of Zango and the discretion granted to providers.
What is clear to us from the statutory language,
history, and case law is that providers do not have
unfettered discretion to declare online content
“objectionable” and blocking and filtering decisions
that are driven by anticompetitive animus are not
entitled to immunity under section 230(c)(2).
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-appellant Enigma Software Group USA,
LLC, is a Florida company that sells computer
security software nationwide. Malwarebytes Inc., a
Delaware corporation headquartered in California,
also sells computer security software nationwide.
Malwarebytes and Enigma are therefore direct
competitors.
Providers of computer security software help users
identify and block malicious or threatening software,
termed malware, from their computers. Each
provider generates its own criteria to determine
what software might threaten users. Defendant
Malwarebytes programs its software to search for
what it calls Potentially Unwanted Programs
(“PUPs”). PUPs include, for example, what
Malwarebytes describes as software that contains
“obtrusive, misleading, or deceptive advertisements,
branding or search practices.” Once Malwarebytes’s
security software is purchased and installed on a
user’s computer, it scans for PUPs, and according to
Enigma’s complaint, if the user tries to download a
program that Malwarebytes has determined to be a
PUP, a pop-up alert warns the user of a security risk
and advises the user to stop the download and block
the potentially threatening content.
Malwarebytes and Enigma have been direct
competitors since 2008, the year of Malwarebytes’s
inception. In their first eight years as competitors,
neither Enigma nor Malwarebytes flagged the
other’s software as threatening or unwanted. In late
2016, however, Malwarebytes revised its PUPdetection criteria to include any program that,
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according to Malwarebytes, users did not seem to
like.
After the revision, Malwarebytes’s software
immediately began flagging Enigma’s most popular
programs — RegHunter and SpyHunter — as PUPs.
Thereafter, anytime a user with Malwarebytes’s
software tried to download those Enigma programs,
the user was alerted of a security risk and, according
to Enigma’s complaint, the download was prohibited,
i.e. Malwarebytes “quarantined” the programs.
Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes’s new definition
of a PUP includes subjective criteria that
Malwarebytes has “implemented at its own malicious
whim” in order to identify Enigma’s programs as
threats. Enigma characterizes the revision as a
“guise” for anticompetitive conduct, and alleges that
its programs are “legitimate”, “highly regarded”, and
“pose no security threat.” As a result of
Malwarebytes’s actions, Enigma claims that it has
lost customers and revenue and experienced harm to
its reputation.
Enigma brought this action against Malwarebytes
in early 2017, in the Southern District of New York.
Enigma claimed that Malwarebytes has used its
PUP-modification process to advance a “bad faith
campaign of unfair competition” aimed at “deceiving
consumers and interfering with [Enigma’s] customer
relationships.”
Enigma’s complaint alleged four claims, three
under New York state law and one under federal
law. The first state-law claim accused Malwarebytes
of using deceptive business practices in violation of
New York General Business Law § 349. Enigma’s
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second and third state-law claims alleged tortious
interference with business and contractual relations
in violation of New York state common law. The
federal claim accused Malwarebytes of making false
and misleading statements to deceive consumers into
choosing Malwarebytes’s security software over
Enigma’s, in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1)(B).
Malwarebytes sought a change of venue. Although
Enigma maintained that venue was proper in New
York because Malwarebytes’s conduct affected users
and computers within that state, the conduct at issue
had national reach. The district court therefore
granted Malwarebytes’s motion to transfer the case
to the Northern District of California, where
Malwarebytes is headquartered.
Malwarebytes then moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, arguing that it was immune from
liability under § 230(c)(2) of the CDA. The district
court granted the motion, finding that under the
reasoning of our decision in Zango, Malwarebytes
was immune under § 230 on all of Enigma’s claims.
The district court interpreted Zango to mean that
anti-malware software providers are free to block
users from accessing any material that those
providers, in their discretion, deem to be
objectionable. Given Malwarebytes’s status as a
provider of filtering software, and its assertion that
Enigma’s programs are potentially unwanted, the
district court held that Malwarebytes could not be
liable under state law for blocking users’ access to
Enigma’s programs.
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With respect to the federal claim, the district court
had to consider the intellectual property exception to
the CDA’s immunity provision set forth in 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(2). The somewhat opaque exception states
that § 230 immunity “shall not be construed to limit
or expand any law pertaining to intellectual
property.” Id. Enigma’s federal claim alleged false
advertising under the Lanham Act, and Enigma
contended that immunity did not apply because that
statute deals with intellectual property, i.e.
trademarks. The district court reasoned, however,
that although the Lanham Act itself deals with
intellectual property, Enigma’s false advertising
claim did not relate to any type of intellectual
property and therefore § 230 immunity encompassed
that claim as well. Having concluded that
Malwarebytes was immune on all four claims, the
district court dismissed the complaint and granted
judgment for Malwarebytes.
On appeal, Enigma primarily contends that the
district court erred in interpreting our Zango opinion
to give online service providers unlimited discretion
to block online content, and that the Good Samaritan
blocking provision does not provide such sweeping
immunity that it encompasses anticompetitive
conduct.
DISCUSSION
I. Scope of § 230(c)(2) Immunity as Applied to
State-Law Claims
The district court held that our opinion in Zango
controlled, and interpreted Zango to mean that an
online-service provider cannot be liable for blocking
internet users from accessing online content that the
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provider considers objectionable, regardless of the
provider’s motivations or the harmful effects of the
blocking. The scope of the statutory catchall phrase,
“otherwise objectionable,” was not at issue in Zango,
however. The central issue in Zango was whether §
230 immunity applies to filtering software providers
like the defendant Kaspersky in that case, and both
parties in this case. See 568 F.3d at 1173, 1176. We
held such providers had immunity. Id. at 1177–78.
At the end of our majority opinion, we emphasized
the relevant statutory language in stating that § 230
permits providers to block material “that either the
provider or the user considers . . . objectionable.” See
id. at 1177 (original emphasis). The district court
focused on that sentence and reasoned that
Malwarebytes had unfettered discretion to select
what criteria makes a program “objectionable” under
§ 230, and further, that the court was not to analyze
Malwarebytes’s reasons for doing so.
The majority in Zango did not, however, address
whether there were limitations on a provider’s
discretion to declare online content “objectionable.”
No such issue was raised in the appeal. We noted
that Zango “waived” the argument that its software
was not “objectionable.” See id. at 1176–77. We
therefore held that § 230 immunity covered
Kaspersky’s decision to block users from accessing
the type of content at issue in that case and
concluded that § 230 permits providers to block
material that “the provider considers . . .
objectionable.” Id. at 1177.
It was Judge Fisher’s concurring opinion in Zango
that framed the issue for future litigation as to
whether the term “objectionable” might be construed
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in a way that would immunize providers even if they
blocked online content for improper reasons. See id.
at 1178–80 (Fisher, J. concurring). Judge Fisher
warned that extending immunity beyond the facts of
that case could “pose serious problems,” particularly
where a provider is charged with using § 230
immunity to advance an anticompetitive agenda. See
id. at 1178. He said that an “unbounded” reading of
the phrase “otherwise objectionable” would allow a
content provider to “block content for anticompetitive
purposes or merely at its malicious whim.” Id.
District courts nationwide have grappled with the
issues discussed in Zango’s majority and concurring
opinions, and have reached differing results. Like the
district court in this case, at least two other federal
district courts have relied on Zango to dismiss
software-provider lawsuits against Malwarebytes
where the plaintiff claimed that Malwarebytes
improperly characterized the plaintiff’s software as a
PUP. See PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v.
Malwarebytes Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal.
2019); PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes,
Inc., No. 1:18-CV-234-RP, 2018 WL 2996897, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018).
Other district courts have viewed our holding in
Zango to be less expansive. See Song fi Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(noting that just because “the statute requires the
user or service provider to subjectively believe the
blocked or screened material is objectionable does
not mean anything or everything YouTube finds
subjectively objectionable is within the scope of
Section 230(c),” and concluding that, “[o]n the
contrary such an ‘unbounded’ reading . . . would
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enable content providers to ‘block content for
anticompetitive reasons[.]’”) (quoting Judge Fisher’s
concurrence in Zango); Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997
F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (same); see
also Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F.
Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011)
(acknowledging that a provider’s subjective
determination of what constitutes objectionable
material under § 230(c)(2) is not limitless, but
finding that the harassing emails in that case were
reasonably objectionable).
We find these decisions recognizing limitations in
the scope of immunity to be persuasive. The courts
interpreting Zango as providing unlimited immunity
seem to us to have stretched our opinion in Zango too
far. This is because the focus of that appeal was
neither what type of material may be blocked, nor
why it may be blocked, but rather who benefits from
§ 230 immunity. The issue was whether § 230
immunity applies to filtering-software providers. See
Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173. We answered that question
in the affirmative, explaining that Kaspersky was
the type of “interactive computer service” to which §
230(c)(2) expressly referred, and that Kaspersky was
engaged in the type of conduct to which § 230(c)(2)
generally applies. Id. at 1175–76.
As relevant here, the majority opinion in Zango
establishes only that Malwarebytes, as a filteringsoftware provider, is an entity to which the
immunity afforded by § 230 would apply. The
majority opinion does not require us to hold that we
lack the authority to question Malwarebytes’s
determinations of what content to block. We must
therefore in this case analyze § 230 to decide what
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limitations, if any, there are on the ability of a
filtering software provider to block users from
receiving online programming.
The legal question before us is whether § 230(c)(2)
immunizes blocking and filtering decisions that are
driven by anticompetitive animus. The majority in
Zango had no occasion to address the issue, and the
parties in that case were not competitors. See 568 F.
3d at 1170 (explaining Kaspersky is a security
software provider; Zango provides an online service
for users to stream movies, video games, and music).
This is the first § 230 case we are aware of that
involves direct competitors.
In this appeal, Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes
blocked Enigma’s programs for anticompetitive
reasons, not because the programs’ content was
objectionable within the meaning of § 230, and that
§ 230 does not provide immunity for anticompetitive
conduct. Malwarebytes’s position is that, given the
catchall, Malwarebytes has immunity regardless of
any anticompetitive motives.
We cannot accept Malwarebytes’s position, as it
appears contrary to CDA’s history and purpose.
Congress expressly provided that the CDA aims “to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services” and to “remove
disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies.” § 230(b)(2)–(3).
Congress said it gave providers discretion to identify
objectionable content in large part to protect
competition, not suppress it. Id. In other words,
Congress wanted to encourage the development of
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filtration technologies, not to enable software
developers to drive each other out of business.
In the infancy of the internet, the unwillingness of
Congress to spell out the meaning of “otherwise
objectionable” was understandable. The broad grant
of protective control over online content may have
been more readily acceptable in an era before the
potential magnitude of internet communication was
fully comprehended. Indeed, the fears of harmful
content at the time led Congress to enact, in the
same statute, an outright ban on the dissemination
of online pornography, a ban which the Supreme
Court swiftly rejected as unconstitutional a year
later. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 877–79
(striking down 47 U.S.C. § 223).
We must today recognize that interpreting the
statute to give providers unbridled discretion to
block online content would, as Judge Fisher warned,
enable and potentially motivate internet-service
providers to act for their own, and not the public,
benefit. See 568 F.3d at 1178 (Fisher, J., concurring).
Immunity for filtering practices aimed at
suppressing competition, rather than protecting
internet users, would lessen user control over what
information they receive, contrary to Congress’s
stated policy. See § 230(b)(3) (to maximize user
control over what content they view). Indeed, users
selecting a security software provider must trust
that the provider will block material consistent with
that user’s desires. Users would not reasonably
anticipate providers blocking valuable online content
in order to stifle competition. Immunizing
anticompetitive blocking would, therefore, be
contrary to another of the statute’s express policies:
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“removing disincentives for the utilization of blocking
and filtering technologies.” Id. § 230(b)(4).
We therefore reject Malwarebytes’s position that
§ 230 immunity applies regardless of anticompetitive
purpose. But we cannot, as Enigma asks us to do,
ignore the breadth of the term “objectionable” by
construing it to cover only material that is sexual or
violent in nature. Enigma would have us read the
general, catchall phrase “otherwise objectionable” as
limited to the categories of online material described
in the seven specific categories that precede it. See 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (describing material that is
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing or otherwise objectionable.”). Enigma
argues that its software has no such content, and
that Malwarebytes therefore cannot claim immunity
for blocking it.
Enigma relies on the principle of ejusdem generis,
which teaches that when a generic term follows
specific terms, the generic term should be construed
to reference subjects akin to those with the specific
enumeration. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am.
Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991).
But the specific categories listed in § 230(c)(2) vary
greatly: Material that is lewd or lascivious is not
necessarily similar to material that is violent, or
material that is harassing. If the enumerated
categories are not similar, they provide little or no
assistance in interpreting the more general category.
We have previously recognized this concept. See
Sacramento Reg’l Cty. Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly, 905
F.2d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Where the list of
objects that precedes the ‘or other’ phrase is
dissimilar, ejusdem generis does not apply”).
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We think that the catchall was more likely
intended to encapsulate forms of unwanted online
content that Congress could not identify in the
1990s. But even if ejusdem generis did apply, it
would not support Enigma’s narrow interpretation of
“otherwise objectionable.” Congress wanted to give
internet users tools to avoid not only violent or
sexually explicit materials, but also harassing
materials. Spam, malware and adware could fairly
be placed close enough to harassing materials to at
least be called “otherwise objectionable” while still
being faithful to the principle of ejusdem generis.
Several district courts have, for example, regarded
unsolicited marketing emails as “objectionable.” See,
e.g., Holomaxx, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; e360Insight,
LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608–610
(N.D. Ill. 2008); see also Smith v. Trusted Universal
Standards In Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. CIV094567-RBK-KMW, 2010 WL 1799456, at *6 (D.N.J.
May 4, 2010). But we do not, in this appeal,
determine the precise relationship between the term
“otherwise objectionable” and the seven categories
that precede it. We conclude only that if a provider’s
basis for objecting to and seeking to block materials
is because those materials benefit a competitor, the
objection would not fall within any category listed in
the statute and the immunity would not apply.
Malwarebytes’s fallback position is that, even if it
would lack immunity for anticompetitive blocking,
Malwarebytes has found Enigma’s programs
“objectionable” for legitimate reasons based on the
programs’ content. Malwarebytes asserts that
Enigma’s programs, SpyHunter and RegHunter, use
“deceptive tactics” to scare users into believing that
they have to download Enigma’s programs to prevent
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their computers from being infected. Enigma alleges,
however, that its programs “pose no security threat”
and that Malwarebytes’s justification for blocking
these “legitimate” and “highly regarded” programs
was a guise for anticompetitive animus.
The district court interpreted our holding in Zango
to foreclose this debate entirely, implicitly reasoning
that if Malwarebytes has sole discretion to select
what programs are “objectionable,” the court need
not evaluate the reasons for the designation. Because
we hold that § 230 does not provide immunity for
blocking a competitor’s program for anticompetitive
reasons, and because Enigma has specifically alleged
that the blocking here was anticompetitive, Enigma’s
claims survive the motion to dismiss. We therefore
reverse the dismissal of Enigma’s state-law claims
and we remand for further proceedings.
II. The Federal Claim and the
Intellectual Property Exception

CDA’s

Enigma’s fourth claim is a claim for false
advertising under the Lanham Act, a statute dealing
with a form of intellectual property, i.e. trademarks.
Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes publicly
mischaracterized Enigma’s programs SpyHunter and
RegHunter as potentially unwanted or PUPs, and it
did so in order to interfere with Enigma’s customer
base and divert those customers to Malwarebytes.
Section 230(e)(2) of the CDA contains an exception
to immunity for intellectual property claims. See 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). This exception, known as the
intellectual property carve out, states that § 230
immunity shall not “limit or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property.” Id. In light of
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that exception, Enigma contends that immunity
would not bar Enigma’s Lanham Act claim, even if
immunity is available to Malwarebytes on the state
law claims. Although Enigma’s claim does not itself
involve an intellectual property right, Enigma
characterizes its federal false advertising claim as
one “pertaining to intellectual property” within the
meaning of § 230(e)(2) because the Lanham Act deals
with intellectual property. The district court rejected
this argument, and rightly so.
This is because even though the Lanham Act is
known as the federal trademark statute, not all
claims brought under the statute involve
trademarks. The Act contains two parts, one
governing trademark infringement and another
governing false designations of origin, false
descriptions, and dilution. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114
(trademark infringement) with id. § 1125 (the rest).
The latter, § 1125, creates two bases of liability, false
association
and
false
advertising.
Compare
§ 1125(a)(1)(A)
(false
association)
with
§ 1125(a)(1)(B) (false advertising). Thus, although
“much of the Lanham Act addresses the registration,
use, and infringement of trademarks and related
marks, . . . § 1125(a) is one of the few provisions that
goes beyond trademark protection.” Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28–29
(2003).
In this appeal, we must decide whether the
exception to immunity contained in § 230(e)(2)
applies to false advertising claims brought under the
Lanham Act. Our court has not addressed the issue,
although we have considered the exception as it
would apply to state law claims. See Perfect 10 v.
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CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that the intellectual property exception
in § 230(e)(2) was not intended to cover intellectual
property claims brought under state law); see also
Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840
F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016) (declining to
analyze the intellectual property exception;
explaining that because “§ 230 does not contain the
grant of immunity from suit contended for, it is
unnecessary to discuss its applicability to the
Lanham Act false advertising claims”).
We have observed before that because Congress did
not define the term “intellectual property law,” it
should be construed narrowly to advance the CDA’s
express policy of providing broad immunity. See
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119. One of these express
policy reasons for providing immunity was, as
Congress stated in § 230(b)(2), “to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). The intellectual
property exception is a limitation on immunity, and
the CDA’s stated congressional purpose counsels
against an expansive interpretation of the exception
that would diminish the scope of immunity. If the
intellectual property law exception were to
encompass any claim raised under the Lanham Act—
including false advertising claims that do not directly
involve intellectual property rights—it would create
a potential for new liability that would upset, rather
than “preserve” the vibrant culture of innovation on
the internet that Congress envisioned. Id.
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We therefore hold that the intellectual property
exception contained in § 230(e)(2) encompasses
claims pertaining to an established intellectual
property right under federal law, like those inherent
in a patent, copyright, or trademark. The exception
does not apply to false advertising claims brought
under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, unless the claim
itself involves intellectual property.
Here, Enigma’s Lanham Act claim derives from the
statute’s false advertising provision. Enigma alleges
that Malwarebytes mischaracterized Enigma’s most
popular software programs in order to divert
Enigma’s customers to Malwarebytes. These
allegations do not relate to or involve trademark
rights or any other intellectual property rights. Thus,
Enigma’s false advertising claim is not a claim
“pertaining to intellectual property law” within the
meaning of § 230(e)(2). The district court correctly
concluded that the intellectual property exception to
immunity does not encompass Enigma’s Lanham Act
claim.
The district court went on to hold, however, as it
did with the state law claims, that Malwarebytes is
nevertheless immune from liability under our
decision in Zango. As we have explained with respect
to the state law claims, Zango did not define an
unlimited scope of immunity under § 230, and
immunity under that section does not extend to
anticompetitive conduct. Because the federal claim,
like the state claims, is based on allegations of such
conduct, the federal claim survives dismissal. We
therefore reverse the district court’s judgment in
favor of Malwarebytes and remand for further
proceedings on this claim as well.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is reversed and
the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
In his concurring opinion in Zango, Inc. v.
Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1179–80 (9th
Cir. 2009), Judge Fisher acknowledged that “until
Congress clarifies the statute or a future litigant
makes the case for a possible limitation,” the
“broadly worded” Communications Decency Act (the
Act) afforded immunity to a distributor of Internet
security software. Congress has not further clarified
the statute and Enigma Software has not
persuasively made a case for limitation of the statute
beyond its provisions.
The majority opinion seeks to limit the statute
based on the fact that the parties are competitors.
See Majority Opinion, p. 6. However, nothing in the
statutory provisions or our majority opinion in Zango
supports such a distinction. Rather the “broad
language” of the Act specifically encompasses “any
action voluntarily taken [by a provider] to restrict
access to . . . material that the provider . . . considers
to be . . . otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Under the language
of the Act, so long as the provider’s action is taken to
remove “otherwise objectionable” material, the
restriction of access is immunized. See id. The
majority’s real complaint is not that the district court
construed the statute too broadly, but that the
statute is written too broadly. However, that defect,
if it is a defect, is one beyond our authority to correct.
See Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct.
2158, 2169 (2015).
In particular, the majority holds that the criteria
for blocking online material may not be based on the
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identity of the entity that produced it. See Majority
Opinion, p. 11. Unfortunately, however, that
conclusion cannot be squared with the broad
language of the Act. Under the language of the
statute, if the blocked content is “otherwise
objectionable” to the provider, the Act bestows
immunity. Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 (“[T]he statute
plainly immunizes from suit a provider of interactive
computer services that makes available software
that filters or screens material that the user or the
provider deems objectionable.”) (emphasis in the
original); 1174 (“According protection to providers of
programs that filter adware and malware is also
consistent with the Congressional goals for immunity
articulated in [47 U.S.C.] § 230 itself.”). Although the
parties were not direct competitors, the plaintiff in
Zango asserted similar anti-competition effects. See
id. at 1171–72. The majority’s policy arguments are
in conflict with our recognition in Zango that the
broad language of the Act is consistent with “the
Congressional goals for immunity” as expressed in
the language of the statute. Id. at 1174. As the
district court cogently noted, we “must presume that
a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)
(citations omitted).
I respectfully dissent.
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SUMMARY**

Communications Decency Act
The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, as
barred by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act,
of claims under New York law and the Lanham Act’s
false advertising provision.
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, and
Malwarebytes, Inc., were providers of software that
helped internet users to filter unwanted content from
their computers. Enigma alleged that Malwarebytes
configured its software to block users from accessing
Enigma’s software in order to divert Enigma’s
customers.
Section 230 immunizes software providers from
liability for actions taken to help users block certain
types of unwanted online material, including
material that is of a violent or sexual nature or is
“otherwise objectionable.” Distinguishing Zango, Inc.
v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009),
the panel held that the phrase “otherwise
objectionable” does not include software that the
provider finds objectionable for anticompetitive
**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the
court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of
the reader.
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reasons. As to the state-law claims, the panel held
that Enigma’s allegations of anticompetitive animus
were sufficient to withstand dismissal. As to the
federal claim, the panel further held that
§ 230’s exception for intellectual property claims did
not apply because this false advertising claim did not
relate to trademarks or any other type of intellectual
property. The panel remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson wrote that § 230 is
broadly worded, and Enigma did not persuasively
make a case for limitation of the statute beyond its
provisions.
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OPINION
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
OVERVIEW
This dispute concerns § 230, the so-called “Good
Samaritan” provision of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, enacted primarily to protect
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minors from harmful online viewing. The provision
immunizes computer-software providers from
liability for actions taken to help users block certain
types of unwanted, online material. The provision
expressly describes material of a violent or sexual
nature, but also includes a catchall for material that
is “otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). We
have previously recognized that the provision
establishes a subjective standard whereby internet
users and software providers decide what online
material is objectionable. See Zango Inc. v. Kaspersky
Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009).
The parties to this dispute are both providers of
software that help internet users filter unwanted
content from their computers. Plaintiff-Appellant
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC has alleged
violations of New York state law and a violation of
the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision. Each
claim is based on the allegation that defendant,
Malwarebytes Inc., has configured its software to
block users from accessing Enigma’s software in
order to divert Enigma’s customers. The district
court, relying on Zango, dismissed the action as
barred by § 230’s broad recognition of immunity. We
did not hold in Zango, however, that the immunity
was limitless.
This case differs from Zango in that here the
parties are competitors. In this appeal Enigma
contends that the “otherwise objectionable” catchall
is not broad enough to encompass a provider’s
objection to a rival’s software in order to suppress
competition. Enigma points to Judge Fisher’s
concurrence in Zango warning against an overly
expansive interpretation of the provision that could
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lead to anticompetitive results. We heed that
warning and reverse the district court’s decision that
read Zango to require such an interpretation. We
hold
that
the
phrase
“otherwise
objectionable” does not include software that the
provider finds objectionable for anticompetitive
reasons.
Malwarebytes contends that it had legitimate
reasons for finding Enigma’s software objectionable
apart from any anticompetitive effect, and that
immunity should therefore apply on Enigma’s statelaw claims, even if the district court erred in its
interpretation of Zango. We conclude, however, that
Enigma’s allegations of anticompetitive animus are
sufficient to withstand dismissal.
Enigma’s federal claim warrants an additional
analytical step. The CDA’s immunity provision
contains an exception for intellectual property
claims, stating that “[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). Enigma
has brought a false advertising claim under the
Lanham Act, a federal statute that deals with
trademarks. Enigma contends that the false
advertising claim is one “pertaining to intellectual
property” and thus outside the scope of § 230
immunity.
Although it is true that the Lanham Act itself deals
with intellectual property, i.e. trademarks, Enigma’s
false advertising claim does not relate to trademarks
or any other type of intellectual property. The
district court therefore correctly held that the
intellectual property exception to immunity does not
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apply to the false advertising claim. The district
court went on to hold that under Zango’s application
of § 230 immunity, Malwarebytes was immune from
liability for false advertising. As with Enigma’s state
law claims, we hold that the district court read
Zango too broadly in dismissing the federal claim.
We therefore reverse the judgment on this claim as
well.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
This appeal centers on the immunity provision
contained in § 230(c)(2) of the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1996). The
CDA, which was enacted as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, contains this “Good
Samaritan” provision that, in subparagraph B,
immunizes internet-service providers from liability
for giving internet users the technical means to
restrict access to the types of material described in
the subparagraph A. Id. § 230(c)(2)(B). The material,
as described in that subparagraph, is “material that
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable.” Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).1

1

Section 230(c) is entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’
blocking and screening of offensive material.” The relevant
subsection (2), “Civil liability,” states, in full, as follows:
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of —
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively
violent,
harassing,
or
otherwise
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This grant of immunity dates back to the early
days of the internet when concerns first arose about
children being able to access online pornography.
Parents could not program their computers to block
online pornography, and this was at least partially
due to a combination of trial court decisions in New
York that had deterred the creation of onlinefiltration efforts. In the first case, Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., a federal court held that passive
providers of online services and content were not
charged with knowledge of, or responsibility for, the
content on their network. See 776 F. Supp 135, 13943 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Therefore, if a provider remained
passive and uninvolved in filtering third-party
material from its network, the provider could not be
held liable for any offensive content it carried from
third parties. See id.
The corollary of this rule, as later articulated by a
New York state trial court, was that once a service
provider undertook to filter offensive content from its
network, it assumed responsibility for any offensive
content it failed to filter, even if it lacked knowledge
of the content. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995) (“Prodigy’s conscious choice, to gain the
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a
objectionable, whether or
constitutionally protected; or

not

such

material

is

(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph [A].”
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A), (B).
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greater liability than CompuServe and other
computer networks that make no such choice.”),
superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137, as recognized in
Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of N.Y., Inc., 952
N.E.2d 1011 (2011). Representative Chris Cox
warned during debates on proposed legislation aimed
at overruling Stratton Oakmont, that premising
liability on providers’ efforts to filter out offensive
material was deterring software companies from
providing the filtering software and tools that could
help parents block pornography and other offensive
material from their home computers. See 141 Cong.
Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
The Stratton Oakmont decision, along with the
increasing public concern about pornography on the
internet, served as catalysts for legislators to
consider greater internet regulation. Congress
considered, in early 1995, two different amendments
to the Telecommunications Act. The first, called the
Exon-Coats amendment, targeted pornography at
the source by prohibiting its dissemination. See id. at
16,068. Proponents of this bill argued that parents
lacked the technological sophistication needed to
implement online-filtration tools and that the
government therefore needed to step in. Id. at
16,099. The second proposal, entitled the Online
Family Empowerment Act (“OFEA”), targeted
internet pornography at the receiving end by
encouraging further development of filtration tools.
Id. at 22,044. Proponents of this bill pointed out that
prohibiting pornography at the source raised
constitutional issues involving prior restraint, and
argued that parents, not government bureaucrats,
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were better positioned to protect their children from
offensive online material. Id. at 16,013.
On February 1, 1996, Congress enacted both
approaches as part of the CDA. The Exon-Coats
amendment was codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223, but was
later invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
877-79 (1997). Before us is OFEA’s approach,
enacted as § 230(c)(2) of the CDA. See Pub L. No.
104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137-39. By immunizing
internet-service providers from liability for any
action taken to block, or help users block offensive
and objectionable online content, Congress overruled
Stratton Oakmont and thereby encouraged the
development of more sophisticated methods of online
filtration. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-879, at 194
(1996).
The history of § 230(c)(2) shows that access to
pornography was Congress’s motivating concern, but
the language used in § 230 included much more,
covering any online material considered to be
“excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)—(B).
Perhaps to guide the interpretation of this broad
language, Congress took the rather unusual step of
setting forth policy goals in the immediately
preceding paragraph of the statute. See id. § 230(b).
Of the five goals, three are particularly relevant
here. These goals were “to encourage the
development of technologies which maximize user
control”; “to empower parents to restrict their
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate
online content”; and “to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the
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Internet and other interactive computer services.”
See id. § 230(b)(2)—(4).
This court has decided one prior case where we
considered the scope of § 230, but were principally
concerned with which types of online-service
providers Congress intended to immunize. See
Zango, 568 F.3d at 1175. We acknowledged that
providers of computer security software can benefit
from § 230 immunity, and that such providers have
discretion to identify what online content is
considered “objectionable,” id., but we had no reason
to discuss the scope of that discretion. The separate
concurrence in Zango focused on the future need for
considering appropriate limitations on provider
control. See id. at 1178-80 (Fisher, J. concurring).
District courts have differed in their interpretations
of Zango and the extent to which it encouraged
providers to block material. What is clear to us from
the statutory language, history and case law is that
the criteria for blocking online material must be
based on the characteristics of the online material,
i.e. its content, and not on the identity of the entity
that produced it.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-appellant Enigma Software Group USA,
LLC, is a Florida company that sells computer
security software nationwide. Malwarebytes Inc., a
Delaware corporation headquartered in California,
also sells computer security software nationwide.
Malwarebytes and Enigma are therefore direct
competitors.
Providers of computer security software help users
identify and block malicious or threatening software,
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termed malware, from their computers. Each
provider generates its own criteria to determine
what software might threaten users. Defendant
Malwarebytes programs its software to search for
what it calls Potentially Unwanted Programs
(“PUPs”). PUPs include, for example, what
Malwarebytes describes as software that contains
“obtrusive, misleading, or deceptive advertisements,
branding or search practices.” Once Malwarebytes’s
security software is purchased and installed on a
user’s computer, it scans for PUPs, and according to
Enigma’s complaint, if the user tries to download a
program that Malwarebytes has determined to be a
PUP, a pop-up alert warns the user of a security risk
and advises the user to stop the download and block
the potentially threatening content.
Malwarebytes and Enigma have been direct
competitors since 2008, the year of Malwarebytes’s
inception. In their first eight years as competitors,
neither Enigma nor Malwarebytes flagged the
other’s software as threatening or unwanted. In late
2016, however, Malwarebytes revised its PUPdetection criteria to include any program that,
according to Malwarebytes, users did not seem to
like.
After the revision, Malwarebytes’s software
immediately began flagging Enigma’s most popular
programs—RegHunter and SpyHunter—as PUPs.
Thereafter, anytime a user with Malwarebytes’s
software tried to download those Enigma programs,
the user was alerted of a security risk and, according
to Enigma’s complaint, the download was prohibited,
i.e. Malwarebytes “quarantined” the programs.
Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes’s new definition
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of a PUP includes subjective criteria that
Malwarebytes has “implemented at its own malicious
whim” in order to identify Enigma’s programs as
threats. Enigma characterizes the revision as a
“guise” for anticompetitive conduct, and alleges that
its programs are “legitimate”, “highly regarded”, and
“pose no security threat.” As a result of
Malwarebytes’s actions, Enigma claims that it has
lost customers and revenue and experienced harm to
its reputation.
Enigma brought this action against Malwarebytes
in early 2017, in the Southern District of New York.
Enigma claimed that Malwarebytes has used its
PUP-modification process to advance a “bad faith
campaign of unfair competition” aimed at “deceiving
consumers and interfering with [Enigma’s] customer
relationships.”
Enigma’s complaint alleged four claims, three
under New York state law and one under federal
law. The first state-law claim accused Malwarebytes
of using deceptive business practices in violation of
New York General Business Law § 349. Enigma’s
second and third state-law claims alleged tortious
interference with business and contractual relations
in violation of New York state common law. The
federal claim accused Malwarebytes of making false
and misleading statements to deceive consumers into
choosing Malwarebytes’s security software over
Enigma’s, in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1)(B).
Malwarebytes sought a change of venue. Although
Enigma maintained that venue was proper in New
York because Malwarebytes’s conduct affected users
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and computers within that state, the conduct at issue
had national reach. The district court therefore
granted Malwarebytes’s motion to transfer the case
to the Northern District of California, where
Malwarebytes is headquartered.
Malwarebytes then moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, arguing that it was immune from
liability under § 230(c)(2) of the CDA. The district
court granted the motion, finding that under the
reasoning of our decision in Zango, Malwarebytes
was immune under § 230 on all of Enigma’s claims.
The district court interpreted Zango to mean that
anti-malware software providers are free to block
users from accessing any material that those
providers, in their discretion, deem to be
objectionable. Given Malwarebytes’s status as a
provider of filtering software, and its assertion that
Enigma’s programs are potentially unwanted, the
district court held that Malwarebytes could not be
liable under state law for blocking users’ access to
Enigma’s programs.
With respect to the federal claim, the district court
had to consider the intellectual property exception to
the CDA’s immunity provision set forth in 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(2). The somewhat opaque exception states
that § 230 immunity “shall not be construed to limit
or expand any law pertaining to intellectual
property.” Id. Enigma’s federal claim alleged false
advertising under the Lanham Act, and Enigma
contended that immunity did not apply because that
statute deals with intellectual property, i.e.
trademarks. The district court reasoned, however,
that although the Lanham Act itself deals with
intellectual property, Enigma’s false advertising
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claim did not relate to any type of intellectual
property and therefore § 230 immunity encompassed
that claim as well. Having concluded that
Malwarebytes was immune on all four claims, the
district court dismissed the complaint and granted
judgment for Malwarebytes.
On appeal, Enigma primarily contends that the
district court erred in interpreting our Zango opinion
to give online service providers unlimited discretion
to block online content, and that the Good Samaritan
blocking provision does not provide such sweeping
immunity that it encompasses anticompetitive
conduct.
DISCUSSION
I. Scope of § 230(c)(2) Immunity as Applied to
State-Law Claims
The district court held that our opinion in Zango
controlled, and interpreted Zango to mean that an
online-service provider cannot be liable for blocking
internet users from accessing online content that the
provider considers objectionable, regardless of the
provider’s motivations or the harmful effects of the
blocking. The scope of the statutory catchall phrase,
“otherwise objectionable,” was not at issue in Zango,
however. The central issue in Zango was whether
§ 230 immunity applies to filtering software
providers like the defendant Kaspersky in that case,
and both parties in this case. See 568 F.3d at 1173,
1176. We held such providers had immunity. Id. at
1177-78. At the end of our majority opinion, we
emphasized the relevant statutory language in
stating that § 230 permits providers to block
material “that either the provider or the user
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considers . . . objectionable.” See id. at 1177 (original
emphasis). The district court focused on that
sentence and reasoned that Malwarebytes had
unfettered discretion to select what criteria makes a
program “objectionable” under § 230, and further,
that the court was not to analyze Malwarebytes’s
reasons for doing so.
The majority in Zango did not, however, address
whether there were limitations on a provider’s
discretion to declare online content “objectionable.”
No such issue was raised in the appeal. We noted
that Zango “waived” the argument that its software
was not “objectionable.” See id. at 1176-77. We
therefore held that § 230 immunity covered
Kaspersky’s decision to block users from accessing
the type of content at issue in that case and
concluded that § 230 permits providers to block
material that “the provider considers . . .
objectionable.” Id. at 1177.
It was Judge Fisher’s concurring opinion in Zango
that framed the issue for future litigation as to
whether the term “objectionable” might be construed
in a way that would immunize providers even if they
blocked online content for improper reasons. See id.
at 1178-80 (Fisher, J. concurring). Judge Fisher
warned that extending immunity beyond the facts of
that case could “pose serious problems,” particularly
where a provider is charged with using § 230
immunity to advance an anticompetitive agenda. See
id. at 1178. He said that an “unbounded” reading of
the phrase “otherwise objectionable” would allow a
content provider to “block content for anticompetitive
purposes or merely at its malicious whim.” Id.
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District courts nationwide have grappled with the
issues discussed in Zango’s majority and concurring
opinions, and have reached differing results. Like the
district court in this case, at least two other federal
district courts have relied on Zango to dismiss
software-provider lawsuits against Malwarebytes
where the plaintiff claimed that Malwarebytes
improperly characterized the plaintiffs software as a
PUP. See PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v.
Malwarebytes Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal.
2019); PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes,
Inc., No. 1:18-CV-234-RP, 2018 WL 2996897, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018).
Other district courts have viewed our holding in
Zango to be less expansive. See Song fi Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(noting that just because “the statute requires the
user or service provider to subjectively believe the
blocked or screened material is objectionable does
not mean anything or everything YouTube finds
subjectively objectionable is within the scope of
Section 230(c),” and concluding that, “[o]n the
contrary such an ‘unbounded’ reading . . . would
enable content providers to ‘block content for
anticompetitive reasons[.]”‘) (quoting Judge Fisher’s
concurrence in Zango); Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997
F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (same); see
also Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F.
Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011)
(acknowledging that a provider’s subjective
determination of what constitutes objectionable
material under § 230(c)(2) is not limitless, but
finding that the harassing emails in that case were
reasonably objectionable).
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We find these decisions recognizing limitations in
the scope of immunity to be persuasive. The courts
interpreting Zango as providing unlimited immunity
seem to us to have stretched our opinion in Zango too
far. This is because the focus of that appeal was
neither what type of material may be blocked, nor
why it may be blocked, but rather who benefits from
§ 230 immunity. The issue was whether § 230
immunity applies to filtering-software providers. See
Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173. We answered that question
in the affirmative, explaining that Kaspersky was
the type of “interactive computer service” to which
§ 230(c)(2) expressly referred, and that Kaspersky
was engaged in the type of conduct to which
§ 230(c)(2) generally applies. Id. at 1175-76.
As relevant here, the majority opinion in Zango
establishes only that Malwarebytes, as a filteringsoftware provider, is an entity to which the
immunity afforded by § 230 would apply. The
majority opinion does not require us to hold that we
lack the authority to question Malwarebytes’s
determinations of what content to block. We must
therefore in this case analyze § 230 to decide what
limitations, if any, there are on the ability of a
filtering software provider to block users from
receiving online programming.
The legal question before us is whether § 230(c)(2)
immunizes blocking and filtering decisions that are
driven by anticompetitive animus. The majority in
Zango had no occasion to address the issue, and the
parties in that case were not competitors. See 568 F.
3d at 1170 (explaining Kaspersky is a security
software provider; Zango provides an online service
for users to stream movies, video games, and music).
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This is the first § 230 case we are aware of that
involves direct competitors.
In this appeal, Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes
blocked Enigma’s programs for anticompetitive
reasons, not because the programs’ content was
objectionable within the meaning of § 230, and that
§ 230 does not provide immunity for anticompetitive
conduct. Malwarebytes’s position is that, given the
catchall, Malwarebytes has immunity regardless of
any anticompetitive motives.
We cannot accept Malwarebytes’s position, as it
appears contrary to CDA’s history and purpose.
Congress expressly provided that the CDA aims “to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services” and to “remove
disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies.” § 230(b)(2)–(3).
Congress said it gave providers discretion to identify
objectionable content in large part to protect
competition, not suppress it. Id. In other words,
Congress wanted to encourage the development of
filtration technologies, not to enable software
developers to drive each other out of business.
In the infancy of the internet, the unwillingness of
Congress to spell out the meaning of “otherwise
objectionable” was understandable. The broad grant
of protective control over online content may have
been more readily acceptable in an era before the
potential magnitude of internet communication was
fully comprehended. Indeed, the fears of harmful
content at the time led Congress to enact, in the
same statute, an outright ban on the dissemination
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of online pornography, a ban which the Supreme
Court swiftly rejected as unconstitutional a year
later. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 877-79 (striking
down 47 U.S.C. § 223).
We must today recognize that interpreting the
statute to give providers unbridled discretion to
block online content would, as Judge Fisher warned,
enable and potentially motivate internet-service
providers to act for their own, and not the public,
benefit. See 568 F.3d at 1178 (Fisher, J., concurring).
Immunity for filtering practices aimed at
suppressing competition, rather than protecting
internet users, would lessen user control over what
information they receive, contrary to Congress’s
stated policy. See § 230(b)(3) (to maximize user
control over what content they view). Indeed, users
selecting a security software provider must trust
that the provider will block material consistent with
that user’s desires. Users would not reasonably
anticipate providers blocking valuable online content
in order to stifle competition. Immunizing
anticompetitive blocking would, therefore, be
contrary to another of the statute’s express policies:
“removing disincentives for the utilization of blocking
and filtering technologies.” Id. § 230(b)(4).
We therefore reject Malwarebytes’s position that
§ 230 immunity applies regardless of anticompetitive
purpose. But we cannot, as Enigma asks us to do,
ignore the breadth of the term “objectionable” by
construing it to cover only material that is sexual or
violent in nature. Enigma would have us read the
general, catchall phrase “otherwise objectionable” as
limited to the categories of online material described
in the seven specific categories that precede it. See 47
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U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (describing material that is
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing or otherwise objectionable.”). Enigma
argues that its software has no such content, and
that Malwarebytes therefore cannot claim immunity
for blocking it.
Enigma relies on the principle of ejusdem generis,
which teaches that when a generic term follows
specific terms, the generic term should be construed
to reference subjects akin to those with the specific
enumeration. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am.
Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991).
But the specific categories listed in § 230(c)(2) vary
greatly: Material that is lewd or lascivious is not
necessarily similar to material that is violent, or
material that is harassing. If the enumerated
categories are not similar, they provide little or no
assistance in interpreting the more general category.
We have previously recognized this concept. See
Sacramento Reg’l Cty. Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly, 905
F.2d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Where the list of
objects that precedes the ‘or other’ phrase is
dissimilar, ejusdem generis does not apply”).
We think that the catchall was more likely
intended to encapsulate forms of unwanted online
content that Congress could not identify in the
1990s. But even if ejusdem generis did apply, it
would not support Enigma’s narrow interpretation of
“otherwise objectionable.” Congress wanted to give
internet users tools to avoid not only violent or
sexually explicit materials, but also harassing
materials. Spam, malware and adware could fairly
be placed close enough to harassing materials to at
least be called “otherwise objectionable” while still
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being faithful to the principle of ejusdem generis.
Several district courts have, for example, regarded
unsolicited marketing emails as “objectionable.” See,
e.g., Holomaxx, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; e360Insight,
LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608-610
(N.D. Ill. 2008); see also Smith v. Trusted Universal
Standards In Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. CIV094567-RBK-KMW, 2010 WL 1799456, at *6 (D.N.J.
May 4, 2010). But we do not, in this appeal,
determine the precise relationship between the term
“otherwise objectionable” and the seven categories
that precede it. We conclude only that if a provider’s
basis for objecting to and seeking to block materials
is because those materials benefit a competitor, the
objection would not fall within any category listed in
the statute and the immunity would not apply.
Malwarebytes’s fallback position is that, even if it
would lack immunity for anticompetitive blocking,
Malwarebytes has found Enigma’s programs
“objectionable” for legitimate reasons based on the
programs’ content. Malwarebytes asserts that
Enigma’s programs, SpyHunter and RegHunter, use
“deceptive tactics” to scare users into believing that
they have to download Enigma’s programs to prevent
their computers from being infected. Enigma alleges,
however, that its programs “pose no security threat”
and that Malwarebytes’s justification for blocking
these “legitimate” and “highly regarded” programs
was a guise for anticompetitive animus.
The district court interpreted our holding in Zango
to foreclose this debate entirely, implicitly reasoning
that if Malwarebytes has sole discretion to select
what programs are “objectionable,” the court need
not evaluate the reasons for the designation. Because
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we hold that § 230 does not provide immunity for
blocking a competitor’s program for anticompetitive
reasons, and because Enigma has specifically alleged
that the blocking here was anticompetitive, Enigma’s
claims survive the motion to dismiss. We therefore
reverse the dismissal of Enigma’s state-law claims
and we remand for further proceedings.
II. The Federal Claim and the
Intellectual Property Exception

CDA’s

Enigma’s fourth claim is a claim for false
advertising under the Lanham Act, a statute dealing
with a form of intellectual property, i.e. trademarks.
Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes publicly
mischaracterized Enigma’s programs SpyHunter and
RegHunter as potentially unwanted or PUPs, and it
did so in order to interfere with Enigma’s customer
base and divert those customers to Malwarebytes.
Section 230(e)(2) of the CDA contains an exception
to immunity for intellectual property claims. See 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). This exception, known as the
intellectual property carve out, states that § 230
immunity shall not “limit or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property.” Id. In light of
that exception, Enigma contends that immunity
would not bar Enigma’s Lanham Act claim, even if
immunity is available to Malwarebytes on the state
law claims. Although Enigma’s claim does not itself
involve an intellectual property right, Enigma
characterizes its federal false advertising claim as
one “pertaining to intellectual property” within the
meaning of § 230(e)(2) because the Lanham Act deals
with intellectual property. The district court rejected
this argument, and rightly so.
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This is because even though the Lanham Act is
known as the federal trademark statute, not all
claims brought under the statute involve
trademarks. The Act contains two parts, one
governing trademark infringement and another
governing false designations of origin, false
descriptions, and dilution. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114
(trademark infringement) with id. § 1125 (the rest).
The latter, § 1125, creates two bases of liability, false
association and false advertising. Compare § 1125
(a)(1)(A) (false association) with § 1125 (a)(1)(B)
(false advertising). Thus, although “much of the
Lanham Act addresses the registration, use, and
infringement of trademarks and related marks, . . .
§ 1125(a) is one of the few provisions that goes
beyond trademark protection.” Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28-29
(2003).
In this appeal, we must decide whether the
exception to immunity contained in § 230(e)(2)
applies to false advertising claims brought under the
Lanham Act. Our court has not addressed the issue,
although we have considered the exception as it
would apply to state law claims. See Perfect 10 v.
CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that the intellectual property exception
in § 230(e)(2) was not intended to cover intellectual
property claims brought under state law); see also
Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840
F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016) (declining to
analyze the intellectual property exception;
explaining that because “§ 230 does not contain the
grant of immunity from suit contended for, it is
unnecessary to discuss its applicability to the
Lanham Act false advertising claims”).
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We have observed before that because Congress did
not define the term “intellectual property law,” it
should be construed narrowly to advance the CDA’s
express policy of providing broad immunity See
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119. One of these express
policy reasons for providing immunity was, as
Congress stated in § 230(b)(2), “to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). The intellectual
property exception is a limitation on immunity, and
the CDA’s stated congressional purpose counsels
against an expansive interpretation of the exception
that would diminish the scope of immunity If the
intellectual property law exception were to
encompass any claim raised under the Lanham Act—
including false advertising claims that do not directly
involve intellectual property rights—it would create
a potential for new liability that would upset, rather
than “preserve” the vibrant culture of innovation on
the internet that Congress envisioned. Id.
We therefore hold that the intellectual property
exception contained in § 230(e)(2) encompasses
claims pertaining to an established intellectual
property right under federal law, like those inherent
in a patent, copyright, or trademark. The exception
does not apply to false advertising claims brought
under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, unless the claim
itself involves intellectual property.
Here, Enigma’s Lanham Act claim derives from the
statute’s false advertising provision. Enigma alleges
that Malwarebytes mischaracterized Enigma’s most
popular software programs in order to divert
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Enigma’s customers to Malwarebytes. These
allegations do not relate to or involve trademark
rights or any other intellectual property rights. Thus,
Enigma’s false advertising claim is not a claim
“pertaining to intellectual property law” within the
meaning of § 230(e)(2). The district court correctly
concluded that the intellectual property exception to
immunity does not encompass Enigma’s Lanham Act
claim.
The district court went on to hold, however, as it
did with the state law claims, that Malwarebytes is
nevertheless immune from liability under our
decision in Zango. As we have explained with respect
to the state law claims, Zango did not define an
unlimited scope of immunity under § 230, and
immunity under that section does not extend to
anticompetitive conduct. Because the federal claim,
like the state claims, is based on allegations of such
conduct, the federal claim survives dismissal. We
therefore reverse the district court’s judgment in
favor of Malwarebytes and remand for further
proceedings on this claim as well.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is reversed and
the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
In his concurring opinion in Zango, Inc. v.
Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1179-80 (9th Cir.
2009), Judge Fisher acknowledged that “until
Congress clarifies the statute or a future litigant
makes the case for a possible limitation,” the
“broadly worded” Communications Decency Act (the
Act) afforded immunity to a distributor of Internet
security software. Congress has not further clarified
the statute and Enigma Software has not
persuasively made a case for limitation of the statute
beyond its provisions.
The majority opinion seeks to limit the statute
based on the fact that the parties are competitors.
See Majority Opinion, p. 4. However, nothing in the
statutory provisions or our majority opinion in Zango
supports such a distinction. Rather the “broad
language” of the Act specifically encompasses “any
action voluntarily taken [by a provider] to restrict
access to . . . material that the provider . . . considers
to be . . . otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Under the language
of the Act, so long as the provider’s action is taken to
remove “otherwise objectionable” material, the
restriction of access is immunized. See id. The
majority’s real complaint is not that the district court
construed the statute too broadly, but that the
statute is written too broadly. However, that defect,
if it is a defect, is one beyond our authority to correct.
See Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct.
2158, 2169 (2015).
In particular, the majority holds that the criteria
for blocking online material may not be based on the
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identity of the entity that produced it. See Majority
Opinion, p. 10. Unfortunately, however, that
conclusion cannot be squared with the broad
language of the Act. Under the language of the
statute, if the blocked content is “otherwise
objectionable” to the provider, the Act bestows
immunity. Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 (“[T]he statute
plainly immunizes from suit a provider of interactive
computer services that makes available software
that filters or screens material that the user or the
provider deems objectionable.”) (emphasis in the
original); 1174 (“According protection to providers of
programs that filter adware and malware is also
consistent with the Congressional goals for immunity
articulated in [47 U.S.C.] § 230 itself.”). Although the
parties were not direct competitors, the plaintiff in
Zango asserted similar anti-competition effects. See
id. at 1171-72. The majority’s policy arguments are
in conflict with our recognition in Zango that the
broad language of the Act is consistent with “the
Congressional goals for immunity” as expressed in
the language of the statute. Id. at 1174. As the
district court cogently noted, we “must presume that
a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)
(citations omitted).
I respectfully dissent.
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APPENDIX C
_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION
_________
ENIGMA SOFTWARE GROUP USA LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
MALWAREBYTES INC.,
Defendant.
_________
Case No. 5:17-cv-02915-EJD
_________
Filed: November 7, 2017
_________
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS
Re: Dkt. No. 97
_________
Plaintiff Enigma Software Group USA LLC
(“Enigma”) brings claims against Defendant
Malwarebytes Inc. based on its allegation that
Malwarebytes unlawfully characterized Enigma’s
software as harmful to users’ computers.
Malwarebytes now moves to dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Malwarebytes’s motion will be
granted.
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I.

BACKGROUND

Malwarebytes develops software that protects
internet users from malware, adware, and other
unwanted computer programs. First Am. Compl.
(“FAC”) ¶¶ 3, 36, Dkt. No. 33. Malwarebytes’s
software scans users’ computers for “potentially
unwanted programs,” which it automatically flags
and quarantines. Id. ¶ 5. When the software detects
an unwanted program, it displays a notification and
asks the user if she wants to remove the program
from her computer. Id.
Enigma also provides anti-malware software to
internet users. Id. ¶ 4. Enigma alleges that, in 2016,
Malwarebytes revised the criteria it uses to identify
unwanted programs. Id. ¶ 7. Under the new criteria,
Malwarebytes’s
software
identifies
Enigma’s
software as a potential threat. Id. Enigma alleges
that Malwarebytes’s classification of Enigma’s
software is wrong because Enigma’s programs “are
legitimate and pose no security threat to users’
computers.” Id. ¶ 9. Enigma alleges that
Malwarebytes revised its criteria to interfere with
Enigma’s customer base and to retaliate against
Enigma for a separate lawsuit Enigma filed against
a Malwarebytes affiliate. Id. ¶¶ 8, 19–20.
On that basis, Enigma brings claims for (1) false
advertising in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
(FAC ¶¶ 134–43), (2) violations of New York General
Business Law § 3491 (FAC ¶¶ 144–50), (3) tortious
interference with contractual relations (FAC ¶¶ 151–
1

This case was transferred from the Southern District of New
York on May 12, 2017. Dkt. No. 67.
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160), and (4) tortious interference with business
relations (FAC ¶¶ 161–68).
Malwarebytes now moves to dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”), Dkt.
No. 97.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
tests the legal sufficiency of claims alleged in the
complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51
F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal “is proper
only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an
absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a
cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d
729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The complaint “must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
III. DISCUSSION
Malwarebytes argues that all of Enigma’s claims
are barred by the immunity provisions of § 230(c)(2)
of the Communications Decency Act. Mot. 7. That
section provides:
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
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objectionable, whether or not such material
is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make
available to information content providers
or others the technical means to restrict
access to material described in paragraph
(1).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). Congress enacted these
provisions “to encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what
information is received by individuals, families, and
schools who use the Internet,” and to encourage
“development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies.” Id. § 230(b)(3), (4).
Malwarebytes
argues
that
this
case
is
“indistinguishable” from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
in Zango interpreting § 230(c)(2). Mot. 8; Zango, Inc.
v. Kaspersky, 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009). In that
case, Zango alleged that Kaspersky’s anti-malware
software incorrectly classified Zango’s software as
harmful. Zango, 568 F.3d at 1170–71. The Ninth
Circuit considered whether “companies that provide
filtering tools,” such as Kaspersky, are eligible for
immunity under § 230(c). Id. at 1173. The panel first
explained that providers of blocking software are
eligible for § 230(c)(2) immunity as long as they meet
the statutory requirements. Id. at 1173–75. Next, it
found that Kaspersky was an “interactive computer
service” within the meaning of the statute. Id. at
1175–76. It also found that Kaspersky “has ‘made
available’ for its users the technical means to restrict
items that Kaspersky has defined as malware.” Id. at
1176. The panel found that Kaspersky qualified for
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immunity under § 230(c)(2)(B) “so long as the
blocked items are objectionable material under
§ 230(c)(2)(A).” Id. It concluded that Kaspersky
properly classified malware as “objectionable”
material, and as such, it found that Kaspersky
satisfied the requirements for immunity under
§ 230(c)(2)(B). Id. at 1177–78 (holding that any
“provider of access tools that filter, screen, allow, or
disallow content that the provider or user considers
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable is protected
from liability by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) for any
action taken to make available to others the
technical means to restrict access to that material”).
Enigma argues that Zango is distinguishable in
two respects. First, Enigma argues that malware, as
defined by Malwarebytes’s criteria, is not one of the
types of materials to which § 230(c)(2) immunity
applies. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss
(“Opp’n”) 11–12, 14, Dkt. No. 100. By its terms,
§ 230(c)(2)(A) applies to material that is “obscene,
lewd,
lascivious,
filthy,
excessively
violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” § 230(c)(2)(B)
applies to the same material.2 Enigma argues that
malware is not within the scope of “objectionable”
material because it is “not remotely related to the
content categories enumerated” in subsection (A)
(i.e., materials that are “obscene, lewd, lascivious,”
and so on). Opp’n 10. Enigma further argues that
2

Subsection (B) refers to “material described in paragraph
(1).” This is a typo in the statute; it should read: “material
described in paragraph (A).” See Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 n.5
(“ ‘paragraph (1)’ is a scrivener’s error referring to ‘paragraph
(A)’ ”).
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Zango did not address whether an anti-malware
provider has discretion to decide what is
“objectionable,” because, as the Ninth Circuit noted,
Zango waived that argument by failing to raise it in
its opening appellate brief. Id.; Zango, 568 F.3d at
1175–76.
However, while it is true that the Zango panel
found that Zango waived this argument, Enigma
overlooks Zango’s clear holding that § 230(c)(2)(B)
immunity applies to “a provider of computer services
that makes available software that filters or screens
material that the user or the provider deems
objectionable.” Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 (emphasis in
original); see also id. at 1177 (holding that immunity
applies to material “that the provider or user
considers . . . objectionable”) (emphasis added); id.
(immunity applies to “material that either the user
or the provider deems objectionable”) (emphasis in
original). This interpretation of Zango aligns with
the plain language of the statute, which likewise
states that immunity applies to “material that the
provider or user considers to be . . . objectionable.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In Zango, the
provider of the anti-malware software, Kaspersky,
exercised its discretion to select the criteria it would
use to identify objectionable computer programs. The
Ninth Circuit held that malware, as Kaspersky
defined it, was properly within the scope of
“objectionable” material. In that respect, the Court
agrees with Malwarebytes that Zango is factually
indistinguishable from the scenario here.
Second, Enigma argues that Malwarebytes is
entitled to § 230(c)(2)(B) immunity only if it acted in
“good faith.” Opp’n 11–14. Subsection (A) protects
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“any action voluntarily taken in good faith” to
restrict access to objectionable material (emphasis
added). Subsection (B) does not contain a good-faith
requirement. Nonetheless, Enigma argues that good
faith is “an implied requirement in subsection (B)
that is part and parcel of the proper, plain meaning
of the statute when read as a whole.” Opp’n 14. The
Zango court did not decide whether subsection (B)
contains a good-faith requirement, since Zango
waived that argument on appeal and the panel did
not need to resolve it to reach its decision. Zango, 568
F.3d at 1177. However, as the panel recognized,
subsection (B) “has no good faith language.” Id. Here,
the Court must assume that Congress acted
intentionally when it decided to include a good-faith
requirement in subsection (A) but not in (B). See,
e.g., Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
253–54 (1992) (“[I]n interpreting a statute a court
should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before
all others. We have stated time and again that courts
must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.”); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146
(1995) (“The difference between the two provisions
demonstrates that, had Congress meant to broaden
application of the statute . . . , Congress could and
would have so specified.”). This reading is bolstered
by the fact that subsection (B) includes an explicit
reference to subsection (A) with respect to the types
of material to which immunity applies. Congress
could have included a similar reference in subection
(B) to subsection (A)’s good-faith requirement, but it
chose not to. As such, the Court agrees with
Malwarebytes that it need not consider whether
Malwarebytes acted in good faith for the purposes of
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deciding whether Malwarebytes is entitled to
immunity under § 230(c)(2)(B). Def.’s Reply in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss (“Reply”) 5–7, Dkt. No.
102.
Enigma argues Malwarebytes is nonetheless
ineligible for immunity with respect to Enigma’s
Lanham Act claim (FAC ¶¶ 134–143) because § 230
provides that “nothing in [§ 230] shall be construed
to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual
property.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2); Opp’n 15.3 Enigma’s
argument fails because its complaint does not allege
an intellectual property claim. The Lanham Act
contains two parts: one governing trademark
infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114) and one governing
unfair competition (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). The unfair
competition provision, in turn, “creates two distinct
bases of liability”: one governing false association (15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)) and one governing false
advertising (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)). Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1377, 1384 (2014). Enigma’s complaint asserts a
false advertising claim under § 1125(a)(1)(B). FAC
¶ 135. Enigma does not assert claims under the
trademark provisions of the Lanham Act. The
complaint does not allege that Enigma owns
trademarks or any other form of intellectual
property, nor does it allege that Malwarebytes has
committed any form of intellectual property
infringement, including misuse of its trademarks.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Enigma’s false
3

Enigma does not dispute that immunity would apply to its
other three claims for business torts. Opp’n 15; see also Zango,
568 F.3d at 1177 (“we have interpreted § 230 immunity to cover
business torts”).
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advertising claim under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(B), does not arise under a “law pertaining
to intellectual property” under 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d
1077, 1109–10 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Since false
advertising . . . does not pertain to intellectual
property rights, the Court finds that the immunity
provided under the CDA for [the plaintiff’s] false
advertising claim is not excluded under § 230(e)(2).”).
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Malwarebytes is entitled to immunity
under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) with respect to all of
Enigma’s claims, Malwarebytes’s motion to dismiss
is GRANTED. The Clerk shall close this file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 7, 2017
/s/
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge
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APPENDIX D
_________
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
_________
1.

47 U.S.C. § 230 provides:

Protection for private blocking and screening
of offensive material
(a) Findings
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and
other interactive computer services available to
individual Americans represent an extraordinary
advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of
control over the information that they receive, as
well as the potential for even greater control in the
future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer
services offer a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer
services have flourished, to the benefit of all
Americans, with a minimum of government
regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on
interactive media for a variety of political,
educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
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(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies
which maximize user control over what information
is received by individuals, families, and schools who
use the Internet and other interactive computer
services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies
that empower parents to restrict their children’s
access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
computer.
(c) Protection for ‘‘Good Samaritan’’ blocking
and screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information
content provider.
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(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available
to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).1
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at
the time of entering an agreement with a customer
for the provision of interactive computer service and
in a manner deemed appropriate by the provider,
notify such customer that parental control
protections (such as computer hardware, software, or
filtering services) are commercially available that
may assist the customer in limiting access to
material that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall
identify, or provide the customer with access to
information identifying, current providers of such
protections.
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law

1

So in original. Probably should be “subparagraph (A).”
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair
the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title,
chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to
sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any
other Federal criminal statute.
(2) No effect on intellectual property law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prevent any State from enforcing any State law that
is consistent with this section. No cause of action
may be brought and no liability may be imposed
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.
(4) No effect on communications privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
the application of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made
by such Act, or any similar State law.
(5) No effect on sex trafficking law
Nothing in this section (other than subsection
(c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit—
(A) any claim in a civil action brought under
section 1595 of title 18, if the conduct underlying
the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591 of
that title;
(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought
under State law if the conduct underlying the
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charge would constitute a violation of section 1591
of title 18; or
(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought
under State law if the conduct underlying the
charge would constitute a violation of section
2421A of title 18, and promotion or facilitation of
prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the
defendant’s promotion or facilitation of prostitution
was targeted.
(f) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Internet
The term ‘‘Internet’’ means the international
computer network of both Federal and non-Federal
interoperable packet switched data networks.
(2) Interactive computer service
The term ‘‘interactive computer service’’ means any
information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access
to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.
(3) Information content provider
The term ‘‘information content provider’’ means
any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or
in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service.
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(4) Access software provider
The term ‘‘access software provider’’ means a
provider of software (including client or server
software), or enabling tools that do any one or more
of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache,
search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate
content.

72a
2.

47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012) provides:

Protection for private blocking and screening
of offensive material
a) Findings
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and
other interactive computer services available to
individual Americans represent an extraordinary
advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of
control over the information that they receive, as
well as the potential for even greater control in the
future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer
services offer a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer
services have flourished, to the benefit of all
Americans, with a minimum of government
regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on
interactive media for a variety of political,
educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States—
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(1) to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies
which maximize user control over what information
is received by individuals, families, and schools who
use the Internet and other interactive computer
services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies
that empower parents to restrict their children’s
access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
computer.
(c) Protection for ‘‘Good Samaritan’’ blocking
and screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information
content provider.
(2) Civil liability
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No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available
to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).1
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service
A provider of interactive computer service shall,
at the time of entering an agreement with a
customer for the provision of interactive computer
service and in a manner deemed appropriate by the
provider, notify such customer that parental
control protections (such as computer hardware,
software, or filtering services) are commercially
available that may assist the customer in limiting
access to material that is harmful to minors. Such
notice shall identify, or provide the customer with
access to information identifying, current providers
of such protections.
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of
1
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this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title
18, or any other Federal criminal statute.
(2) No effect on intellectual property law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual
property.
(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prevent any State from enforcing any State law
that is consistent with this section. No cause of
action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section.
(4) No effect on communications privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit the application of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the
amendments made by such Act, or any similar
State law.
(f) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Internet
The term ‘‘Internet’’ means the international
computer network of both Federal and nonFederal interoperable packet switched data
networks.
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(2) Interactive computer service
The term ‘‘interactive computer service’’ means
any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system
that provides access to the Internet and such
systems operated or services offered by libraries
or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider
The term ‘‘information content provider’’ means
any person or entity that is responsible, in whole
or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service.
(4) Access software provider
The term ‘‘access software provider’’ means a
provider of software (including client or server
software), or enabling tools that do any one or
more of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache,
search, subset, organize, reorganize, or
translate content.

